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INTRODUCTION
Beginning in the 1990s, police departments in major American cities started aggressively deploying pedestrian stops and
1
body searches in response to escalating violent crime rates.
The programmatic deployment of “stop and frisk” or “stop,
2
3
question, and frisk” (SQF) in New York, Chicago, Philadelph4
5
ia, and other major cities involved large numbers of street
stops and frisks, often concentrated in a handful of minority
neighborhoods. Given the volume of individuals stopped, SQF
likely became the modal form of police-citizen contact for many
6
urban residents. Between May and August 2014, for example,
police in Chicago stopped more than 250,000 people—which
7
translates into 93.6 stops per 1000 inhabitants. In Philadelphia, police have stopped between 215,000 and 253,000 people per
8
year since 2009. In Baltimore, the Department of Justice esti1. Tracey L. Meares, The Law and Social Science of Stop and Frisk, 10
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 335, 337, 339 (2014).
2. Id. at 337; see also Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540,
589–94 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing early history of SQF in New York City).
3. Elliott Ramos, Poor Data Keeps Chicago’s Stop and Frisk Hidden from
Scrutiny, WBEZ 91.5 CHIC. (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.wbez.org/news/poor
-data-keeps-chicagos-stop-and-frisk-hidden-scrutiny-108670 (describing use of
stop and frisk in Chicago, but noting absence of sound record-keeping).
4. See, e.g., Erica Goode, Philadelphia Defends Policy on Frisking, with
Limits, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2012, at A11.
5. Laird Harrison, Oakland Police Consultant Defends ‘Stop, Ask and
Frisk,’ KQED NEWS (Feb. 25, 2013), http://blogs.kqed.org/newsfix/2013/02/25/
oakland-police-consultant-defends-stop-ask-and-frisk (discussing SQF policies
in Los Angeles and Oakland).
6. In Chicago, for example, “being stopped for investigative purposes is
the predominant experience residents have with the police.” Wesley G.
Skogan, Stop-and-Frisk and Trust in Police in Chicago (Inst. for Pol’y Res.,
Working Paper No. WP-16-08 (2016)), http://www.ipr.northwestern.edu/
publications/papers/2016/WP-16-08.html (emphasis omitted).
7. ACLU OF ILL., STOP AND FRISK IN CHICAGO 11 (2015), http://www.aclu
-il.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ACLU_StopandFrisk_6.pdf. Because many
individuals were stopped more than once, the effect of the policy was even
more concentrated. See generally id. at 3 (describing how the stops were disproportionately concentrated).
8. David Abrams, The Law and Economics of Stop-and-Frisk, 46 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 369, 378 (2014).
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9

mates, roughly 412,000 people were stopped in 2014. At its
peak in 2011, New York’s SQF policy generated more than
10
685,700 stops per year. Between 2004 and 2013, that city’s in11
habitants experienced roughly five million street stops.
Given the sheer scale of these intrusions into citizens’ daily
lives, it is hardly surprising that SQF would provoke some public controversy. Sharp-elbowed debate has ensued as to whether
African Americans and Hispanics are being inappropriately
12
stopped and searched. In addition to catalyzing a wider na13
tional argument about race and policing, SQF has sparked
14
15
large-scale public protests, mayoral campaigns, threats to
16
sue, and litigation itself. In the wake of legal challenges, settlements or consent decrees regulating the use of street stops
have been reached in the past few years in several cities. In the
17
18
19
last year or so, New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Cincin-

9. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE
BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 25 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/
file/883366/download.
10. CHRISTOPHER DUNN, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, STOP-AND-FRISK
2012, at 3 (Jennifer Carnig ed., 2013), https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/
publications/2012_Report_NYCLU_0.pdf.
11. Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Following the Script: Narratives of
Suspicion in Terry Stops in Street Policing, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 51, 62 (2015).
12. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Fagan et al., Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited: The Demography and Logic of Proactive Policing in a Safe and Changing City, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING: NEW AND ESSENTIAL READINGS
309, 312–14 (Stephen K. Rice & Michael D. White eds., 2010) (documenting
disparities in stops in the New York context); STOP AND FRISK IN CHICAGO,
supra note 7, at 3 (finding the same results in Chicago).
13. For a snapshot of that debate, see Julie Bloom et al., Attack on Officers Jolts a Nation on Edge, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2016, at A1.
14. See, e.g., John Leland & Colin Moynihan, Thousands March Silently
To Protest Stop-and-Frisk Policies, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2012, at A15 (describing a protest in response to SQF).
15. See Khorri Atkinson, Mayor de Blasio To Reform Stop-and-Frisk, N.Y.
AMSTERDAM NEWS (Feb. 6, 2014), http://amsterdamnews.com/news/2014/feb/
06/mayor-de-blasio-reform-stop-and-frisk (describing a mayoral campaign focused on reforming SQF).
16. Aamer Madhani, Chicago Police and ACLU Agree to Stop-and-Frisk
Safeguards, USA TODAY (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
2015/08/07/chicago-police-agree-reform-stop-and-frisk/31277041.
17. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 676, 678 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (appointing a monitor and ordering broad systemic equitable relief ).
18. Settlement Agreement, City of Chicago, Chi. Police Dep’t & Am. Civil
Liberties Union of Ill., Investigatory Stop and Protective Pat Down (2015),
http://www.aclu-il.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/2015-08-06-Investigatory
-Stop-and-Protective-Pat-Down-Settlement-Agreeme.pdf [hereinafter Chicago
Settlement].
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nati, New Orleans, Seattle, Baltimore, Cleveland, and
25
Newark have all entered into either a judicial decree or a similar form of settlement process. Two cities, Boston and Oakland, did not wait for litigation, but engaged expert consultants; in both cases, the consultant isolated evidence of racial
26
discrimination in street policing.
The debate over SQF is heated in part because of disagreement about how the core moral wrong of intensive street
policing (if one exists) should be conceived. The law provides a
starting point for this inquiry, but ultimately not a satisfying
answer.
The legal framework employed by many of the aforementioned settlements and consent decrees is modeled on a body of
black-letter constitutional doctrine that is focused centrally on
the motivations and beliefs of specific, individual officers. For

19. Settlement Agreement, Class Certification, & Consent Decree at 4–5,
Bailey v. City of Philadelphia (E.D. Pa. 2010) (C.A. No. 10-5952), http://www
.aclupa.org/download_file/view_inline/744/198 [hereinafter Philadelphia Settlement].
20. Collaborative Agreement, In re Cincinnati Policing (S.D. Ohio 2002)
(No. C-1-99-317) (on file with author); see also In re Cincinnati Policing, 209
F.R.D. 395, 400–04 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (affirming settlement).
21. United States v. City of New Orleans, 947 F. Supp. 2d 601, 631 (E.D.
La. 2012), aff ’d, 731 F.3d 434 (5th Cir. 2013) (affirming consent decree); Consent Decree Regarding the New Orleans Police Department, United States v.
City of New Orleans, No. 12-1924 (E.D. La. 2012) [hereinafter New Orleans
Decree] (on file with author).
22. Settlement Agreement and Stipulated [Proposed] Order of Resolution,
United States v. City of Seattle, (W.D. Wash. 2012) (No. 12-CV-1282) [hereinafter Seattle Settlement] (on file with author); see also Mahoney v. Holder, 62
F. Supp. 3d 1215, 1218 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (describing settlement process).
23. UNITED STATES & CITY OF BALT., AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND THE CITY OF BALTIMORE REGARDING THE BALTIMORE
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT (2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/883376/
download [hereinafter BALTIMORE AGREEMENT].
24. Josh Saul, America Has a Stop-and-Frisk Problem. Just Look at Philadelphia, NEWSWEEK (May 18, 2016), http://www.newsweek.com/2016/06/10/
stop-and-frisk-philadelphia-crisis-reform-police-460951.html.
25. Id.
26. STANFORD UNIV., SPARQ: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ANSWERS TO REALWORLD QUESTIONS, STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE: RESEARCH INITIATIVES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN
OAKLAND, CALIF. 5–6 (Jennifer L. Eberhardt ed., 2016), https://stanford.app
.box.com/v/Strategies-for-Change [hereinafter OAKLAND REPORT]; Boston Police Commissioner Announces Field Interrogation and Observation (FIO) Study
Results, BPDNEWS.COM (Oct. 8, 2014), http://bpdnews.com/news/2014/10/8/
boston-police-commissioner-announces-field-interrogation-and-observation-fio
-study-results (reporting some racial disparities in both stops and frisks).
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example, in New York, the case of Floyd v. City of New York,
which has yielded the only extensive judicial decision on SQF,
focused first on the Supreme Court’s 1968 decision Terry v.
27
Ohio, which held that officers need “reasonable, articulable
suspicion” of criminality to make a nonconsensual street-stop
28
consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Then, citing the Supreme Court’s 1979 decision in Personnel Administrator v.
29
Feeney, the Floyd court held that plaintiffs had to show that
SQF not only had a racially disparate effect, but had been
adopted “at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its
30
adverse effects upon” certain racial groups.
Other consent decrees and settlements are also crafted in
the shadow of Terry and Feeney. The Seattle settlement is typical in commanding that the police department adopt a streetstop policy that “explicitly conform[s] to constitutional requirements,” that officers be annually trained on “Fourth
Amendment and related law,” and that patrolling police act
31
“free of unlawful bias.” Similarly, the Philadelphia settlement
condemns “stops, frisks, or searches . . . made without the requisite reasonable suspicion” and envisages “policies and practices to ensure that stops and frisks are not conducted on the
basis of the race or ethnic origin of the suspect, except where
32
the law permits race or ethnic origin to be considered . . . .”
This individualist black-letter doctrine means that even
absent litigation to a final judgment, courts and legal reform
efforts have to use a relatively narrow lens trained solely upon
discrete, interpersonal transactions. Similarly, the dominant
economic model of racial bias in policing focuses on the identification of individual officers’ taste-based discrimination over
33
and above statistical discrimination.

27. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
28. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 22). Separately, the Fourth Amendment requires
that an officer “reasonably suspect that the person stopped is armed and dangerous” before conducting a protective pat-down, or frisk. Id. at 568 (quoting
United States v. Lopez, 321 F. App’x 65, 67 (2d Cir. 2009)).
29. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
30. Id. at 662 (quoting Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 163 (2d Cir.
2010)).
31. Seattle Settlement, supra note 22, ¶¶ 140, 142, 145.
32. Philadelphia Settlement, supra note 19, at 1, 4.
33. John Knowles et al., Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory
and Evidence, 109 J. POL. ECON. 203, 205 (2001).
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This Article argues that SQF presents a normative challenge that is not well captured by the individualistic lens of
Terry and Feeney, or by a focus on taste-based discrimination as
a more general matter. The distinctive moral harm of SQF does
not turn on racial animus per Feeney, or weak evidentiary predicates per Terry although both might well exist and even be
pervasive on the ground. This harm, indeed, does not arise
within the narrow, individualist “transactional frame” that cur34
rently dominates both law and economics.
SQF today is defined by its large scale and “group-based”
35
application. Its distinctive moral wrong is inextricably related
to this programmatic quality, not the happenstance of individ36
ual officers’ motives. The core of this wrong is structural. Accordingly, the welfarist analysis I propose in Part I is focused
on the large-scale, programmatic use of SQF as observed in
New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia. In contrast, I have no
cavil with the retail use of Terry stops as an element of
nonprogrammatic street policing. When operationalized at a
large scale, however, SQF is an important link in the reproduction of social and racial stratification. In this regard, it typically
has large regressive distributional effects and surprisingly little value-added as a crime control measure.
More specifically, SQF should be understood as a historically situated innovation that responds to late twentiethcentury urban pathologies in a manner that predictably perpetuates those criminogenic pathologies. The call for SQF arose
in important measure because local and state governments had
34. Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111
YALE L.J. 1311, 1313–14 (2002) (“Constitutional cases, like common-law ones,
are typically conceptualized as discrete transactions in which government inflicts harm on some individual by making her worse off relative to some baseline position or, under equality rules, relative to some reference individual or
group.”).
35. Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the
Fourth Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 821 (2011) (offering this description of New York City’s policy). The dominant “individualism” of Equal Protection jurisprudence has long been subject to decisive and devastating critique.
Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
107, 127 (1976).
36. I use the term “moral wrong” to signal that my argument is not centrally normative, and not legal in nature. My analysis, presented in Part II, is
consequentialist in nature. It is my view that the range of relevant consequences for an evaluation of public policy is capacious, and not limited to narrowly drawn monetizable harms. Recognizing the normative nature of any effort to identify salient costs and benefits, I flag in my analysis those costs or
benefits that rest on a potentially contestable moral judgment.
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engaged in policies that over time fostered minority neighborhoods that remain entrenched in concentrated poverty and suffer from high violent-crime rates. Rather than addressing those
underlying conditions, local and state policy-makers have chosen to respond with a policy that has stigmatizes minority residents, that has limited crime-control benefits, and that imposes
large negative spillovers on disadvantaged neighborhoods.
Viewed in this dynamic perspective, SQF catalyzes an entangled set of individual and neighborhood-level harms.
Through mutually reinforcing interactions, these various
harms reinforce the social and racial stratification that initially
set the stage for massive street policing expenditures. Without
a clear grasp of this ecological and dynamic context, current
remedial interventions are likely to fall short or to go astray.
In response to such ecological and dynamic dimensions,
constitutional law is now disarmed. Some other tool is needed.
Consistent with a growing body of scholarship that resists the
37
narrow transactional frame of current constitutional doctrine
38
and the dominant doctrinal focus on individual officials’ fault,
I argue that our current doctrinal models for capturing the
harms of aggressive policing fall woefully short. Instead, a more
structural and capacious legal framework is needed to encapsulate the core moral objections to SQF.
An alternative, more promising legal framework is a version of the disparate-impact standard familiar from the em39
40
ployment discrimination and fair housing contexts. A dispar37. See Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional
Awareness in Criminal Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2051, 2057 (2016)
(criticizing “criminal courts’ transactional myopia” and their lack of “a holistic
picture of how the criminal justice system operates”).
38. See Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies, 65 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (2015) (“[T]he Court has developed a gatekeeping rule of fault for individualized constitutional remedies . . . .”); Jennifer
E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 706 (2011) (same); see also Aziz Z. Huq & Genevieve Lakier, The Triumph of Fault in Public Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2940016
(mapping out the role of fault concepts in both substantive criminal law and
the law of constitutional remedies).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (“[A] complaining party
demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that
causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is
job-related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.”); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971) (allowing
disparate impact under the 1964 version of Title VII). A disparate-impact the-
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ate-impact framework is better able to account for the evidentiary problems involved in accounting for the diverse forms of
discrimination manifested in a complex system characterized
41
by a high degree of diffused discretion.
To be clear, this alternative approach is by no means perfect. It does not provide a proxy for the thorough evaluation of
both costs and benefits presented in this Article. Rather, disparate impact isolates a subset of problematic cases in which
SQF’s heavy burden is asymmetrically assigned to minority
communities. It demands a robust justification from the state
for that potentially regressive, subordinating, and demoralizing
situation. In this regard, it is better placed than either Fourth
Amendment or Equal Protection doctrine to resist the exacer42
bation of racial hierarchies.
No theory of liability, however, will be a comprehensive
panacea to a complex and entrenched social phenomenon like
concentrated, racialized, poverty. Disparate-impact liability for
SQF captures the instances in which the moral wrong of SQF is
at its acme (even if it does not capture all instances in which
that wrong arises). It helps ensure that policing responses
make matters no worse. It is emphatically only a piece of the
larger mosaic of needful policing reform that ought to be pursued through both judicial and political avenues.
Disparate-impact liability is often overlooked because it
has not been part of Equal Protection doctrine since the early
43
1970s. Because of the Constitution-centered focus of much
scholarship, it is easy to forget it is available. But a disparateimpact standard is available under both federal statutes that
ory of liability is also available under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005).
40. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2513, 2515, 2526 (2015) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a),
3605(a) (1988) to permit disparate-impact liability).
41. See generally Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 494, 520–23 (2003) (discussing the evidentiary use of disparate-impact liability).
42. See id. at 523–24 (arguing that disparate impact is a “mechanism[ ] for
ending segregation and racial hierarchy”).
43. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“[O]ur cases have not
embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to
whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely
because it has a racially disproportionate impact.”). Prior to Davis, disparate
impact was an important element of the constitutional doctrine in this domain. Reva B. Siegel, Foreword, Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13–16
(2013) (collecting cases).
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regulate local police departments and also (in California and
46
47
Illinois ) state law. The Chicago settlement and the New Orleans settlement invoke some of these disparate-impact rules
48
as guiding authorizations. Nevertheless, neither elaborates
upon their bare-bone textual references. As a result, the analytic and practical advantages of a disparate-impact lens for police
remain underappreciated. The theoretical questions raised by
its translation to the policing context also remain poorly understood.
My final aim is to show how disparate impact can serve as
a lens for analyzing street policing in practice. To that end, I
consider how disparate racial impacts might be sifted from the
granular policing data increasingly being collected by large police departments as a result of settlements and consent de49
crees.
Specifically, I sketch three tractable empirical strategies
for identifying disparate impact in street stop-related policies.
First, deployment-related disparities between beats or districts
within a jurisdiction can be measured to ascertain whether a
municipality’s overall distribution of policing resources can be
50
justified on race-neutral grounds. Second, within a given beat
44. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its implementing regulations apply to police departments that receive federal funds. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(2012) (“No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.”); see also 28 C.F.R. § 42.101 (2016) (implementing regulations). The Safe Streets Act also prohibits local police action with a racially
disparate impact. 42 U.S.C. § 3789d(c)(1) (2012) (“No person in any State shall
on the ground of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under or denied employment in connection with any programs or activity
funded in whole or in part with funds made available under this chapter.”); see
also 28 C.F.R. § 42.201 (2016) (implementing regulations).
45. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2 § 11135 (2017); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22,
§ 11154 (c), (i) (2017).
46. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 23/5(a)(1) (2003).
47. See infra Part III.A.
48. Chicago Settlement, supra note 18, at 6; New Orleans Decree, supra
note 21, at 1–2.
49. See generally David A. Harris, Across the Hudson: Taking the Stop
and Frisk Debate Beyond New York City, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y
853, 871–72 (2013) (describing how some consent decrees and settlements require data collection).
50. Larger policy has a role in shaping street-level outcomes. See Shannon
Portillo & Danielle S. Rudes, Construction of Justice at the Street Level, 10
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 321, 331 (2014) (“When police routinize stop and
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or district, disparities in how stops are allocated among differ51
ent ethnic and racial groups can be evaluated. Finally, at the
level of given officers, disparities in the quantum of suspicion
deployed for whites and nonwhites can be assessed by using a
52
range of empirical tools.
By aggregating and contrasting disparities at these different levels, the empirical approach that I sketch roughly enables
a better understanding of the causes and extent of SQF’s disparate impact. That understanding in turn can serve as a foundation for more targeted, less disruptive, and more effective
remedial interventions.
These empirical approaches, moreover, enable disparate
impact’s translation to the policing context while avoiding the
constitutional and practical problems encountered in the employment discrimination context. For each empirical approach
posited, I consider the range of legitimate exculpatory justifications that might be offered to diffuse a prima facie finding of
53
racial disparity. I further respond to weaknesses made apparent by disparate impact’s extant operation in other contexts. In
the employment discrimination context, for example, there has
been disagreement about how to identify business justifications
54
that can justify racial disparities, and the magnitude of ulti55
mate disparities required for liability.
frisk policies, and . . . ration services, attempt to control uncertainty, husband
worker resources, and manage consequences of routines, they do so within the
confines of existing policy.”).
51. Precinct or beat-level effects can be captured through multilevel modeling techniques in which data on stops is structured so that individual racial
groups are nested within precincts. See Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D at 40,
Floyd v. City of N.Y., 813 F. Supp. 2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (08 Civ. 01034
(SAS)), https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/files/Expert_Report_
JeffreyFagan.pdf [hereinafter Fagan Report] (describing modeling technique);
Andrew Gelman et al., An Analysis of the New York City Police Department’s
“Stop-and-Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM.
STAT. ASS’N 813, 817–18 (2007) (same).
52. See Sharad Goel et al., Precinct or Prejudice? Understanding Racial
Disparities in New York City’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, 10 ANNALS APPLIED
STAT. 365, 371 (2016) [hereinafter Goel et al., Precinct or Prejudice?] (describing tools); see also Sharad Goel et al., Combatting Police Discrimination in the
Age of Big Data, 20 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 181, 186 (2017) [hereinafter Goel et al.,
Combatting Police Discrimination].
53. See Abrams, supra note 8, at 375 (discussing potential justifications).
54. The availability of employer justifications has been the subject of dispute both on the Supreme Court and in Congress. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (“[An employer must] demonstrate that the challenged
practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business
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The use of disparate impact in the employment context has
56
also generated worries about the doctrine’s constitutionality
57
and its efficacy in promoting structural policy change. In
translating disparate impact to the policing context, I consider
and reject each of these reasons as a reason for abandoning the
translation.
The possibility of disparate impact as a template for rethinking urban policing has yet to be explored in any detail,
although an earlier article by David Sklansky and colleagues
58
touches on the question. But my analysis aligns with penetrating work by Tracey Meares, Jeffrey Fagan, and Amanda
Geller, all of whom correctly emphasize that SQF is a distinctive mode of urban policing that cannot be analyzed in terms of
discrete interactions because “programmatic stops are imposed
59
from the top down” at a massive scale. Furthermore, I echo
Richard Banks’ worry about the “potential inadequacy as a policy framework” of much constitutional doctrine, although my
necessity.”); Michael Selmi, The Supreme Court’s Surprising and Strategic Response to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 281, 287–89
(2011) (describing disagreements between legislators and President George
H.W. Bush on this topic). Compare Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490
U.S. 642, 659 (1989) (describing a relatively lenient standard for business justifications), with id. at 671–72 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (advocating for a more
demanding standard).
55. See Pamela L. Perry, Two Faces of Disparate Impact Discrimination,
59 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 573–74 (1991) (noting the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission indicates the threshold should be “four-fifths . . . of the
rate for the group with the highest rate,” but also stating alternative views).
56. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 595–96 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“[T]he war between disparate impact and equal protection will be waged
sooner or later, and it behooves us now to begin thinking about how—and on
what terms—to make peace between them.”).
57. Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA
L. REV. 701, 706 (2006) (“[D]isparate impact theory has produced less change
than typically assumed . . . .”); see also George Rutherglen, Abolition in a Different Voice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1463, 1476 (1992) (reviewing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAWS (1992) and arguing that Epstein overstates the impact of disparateimpact theory).
58. See Goel et al., Combatting Police Discrimination, supra note 52, at
28–30.
59. Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV.
159, 162–63 (2015); accord Fagan & Geller, supra note 11, at 61 (“Stop-andfrisk as envisioned by the Terry Court was largely a set of distinct ‘retail’
transactions, characterized by individualization, material or visual indicia,
and specificity. But the current ‘wholesale’ practice is quite different from the
vision of the Terry Court.”).

2408

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:2397

diagnosis and response to the problem of race in policing differ
60
from his approach.
In addition, my analysis diverges sharply from the large
61
literature on “racial profiling,” which more narrowly focuses
on intentional animus or the purposive use of race as a criteri62
on in enforcement decisions. Unlike these analyses, my approach does not focus on individual fault or bad intent. Instead,
I argue that legal intervention should be organized around the
interaction between a specific kind of common policing strategy
and larger social dynamics of racial segmentation and stratifi63
cation.
The argument proceeds in three steps. In Part I, I provide
a comprehensive, empirically robust account of SQF as a distinctive modality of urban policing, highlighting the dynamic
negative effects of SQF upon minority communities in concentrated urban poverty. Part II turns to the constitutional doctrine developed pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and the
Equal Protection Clause to regulate such policing. Using Terry
60. R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug
War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571, 574 (2003).
61. Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but Unconstitutional: Racial Profiling and the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 882, 884 n.2 (2015) (collecting the large legal scholarly
literature on racial profiling).
62. See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075, 1080
(2001) (“Suspect description reliance, like racial profiling, is both useful and
racially discriminatory.”); Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road
Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 651, 654–55 (2002) (“As we use the term, ‘racial profiling’ occurs when a
law enforcement officer questions, stops, arrests, searches, or otherwise investigates a person because the officer believes that members of that person’s racial or ethnic group are more likely than the population at large to commit the
sort of crime the officer is investigating.”); Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (2002)
(same). Outside the legal academy, racial profiling is also defined in criminological, economic, and normative terms. Robin S. Engel, A Critique of the ‘Outcome Test’ in Racial Profiling Research, 25 JUST. Q. 1, 6 (2008) (summarizing
different approaches). My analysis of SQF overlaps with Engel’s “economic”
and “normative” models. Id.
63. For an example of this broader lens, see MICHAEL D. WHITE & HENRY
FRADELLA, STOP AND FRISK: THE USE AND ABUSE OF A CONTROVERSIAL POLICING TACTIC 81–102 (2016) (discussing “collateral consequences” of SQF). The
“disparate impact” analysis defines its central analytic focus in terms of “purposeful” discrimination rather than differential effects. J. Mitchell Pickerill et
al., Search and Seizure, Racial Profiling, and Traffic Stops: A Disparate Impact Framework, 31 LAW & POL’Y 1, 8 (2009). This is not how the term is used
in the legal scholarship, and I do not follow that definition.
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and Feeney as focal points, I demonstrate that constitutional
doctrine systematically fails to account for the harms that flow
from SQF. The gap reveals inconsistencies and internal contradictions within the doctrine. Having rejected the default
framework for legal analysis of SQF, I sketch in Part III an alternative lens of disparate impact. Concluding, I illustrate
three empirical strategies that might be used to determine
whether remedial intervention is warranted. In so doing, I hope
to show that disparate impact is a practicable and plausible
approach for use by courts and other supervisory and regulatory bodies.
I. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF STOP AND FRISK
POLICING
To evaluate stop and frisk as a way of eliciting public order
requires an understanding of its costs and benefits in historical
and social context. This Part therefore begins by offering a definition of SQF as a historically situated strategy employed by
urban police forces. It then develops a careful tally of its pros
and cons.
Some courts have analyzed SQF in terms of costs while
64
bracketing its benefits. I disagree with this approach. Appreciation of the distinctive wrong of SQF demands a comprehensive understanding of related justifications, criticisms, and
benefits, all nested in an ecological and dynamic context.
A. DEFINING STOP AND FRISK (SQF)
Stop, question, and frisk, or SQF, is an urban policing
measure that involves the large-scale deployment of officers in
public spaces (e.g., sidewalks, alleys, the communal outdoor
spaces of public housing) tasked with conducting frequent investigative stops. Under a line of cases beginning with Terry v.
65
Ohio, an officer is entitled to make a “brief” nonconsensual
“investigatory stop” if she has “a reasonable articulable suspi-

64. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (“This Court’s mandate is solely to judge the constitutionality of police
behavior, not its effectiveness as a law enforcement tool.”).
65. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Terry Court did not provide the canonical formulation of the Fourth Amendment standard but instead more ambiguously
asked whether “the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure
or the search ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief ’ that the action taken was appropriate?” Id. at 21–22.
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cion” that a crime either has occurred or is about to occur.
Separately, if the officer has a further reasonable articulable
suspicion that the person stopped is “‘armed and presently
dangerous to the officer or to others,’ he may conduct a ‘limited
67
protective search’ for concealed weapons.”
In either the stop or the frisk context, reasonable articulable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable
cause. But it still requires “a minimal level of objective justifi68
cation.”
In addition to a stop and a frisk, officers may take further
actions ranging from a verbal caution or a citation to an arrest.
Arrests vary widely in character. They can be discretionary or
69
mandatory. They may be based on conduct or evidence discovered by the officer during the stop, or they might be predicated
on an outstanding warrant revealed when a person’s name is
cross-referenced with state, local, or federal databases.
The jurisprudence of Terry stops and frisks focuses on discrete transactions between specific officers and specific defend70
ants. But this is misleading. SQF (as I have defined it) is a
policy that operates today at scale. Not tens or hundreds of individuals but tens or hundreds of thousands are arrested over
the course of months. In New York, for example, there were
71
313,047 documented stops in 2004 and 576,394 stops in 2009.
In Philadelphia, a city with one-fifth New York’s population,
there were more than 200,000 stops each of the last three years

66. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). The earliest use of the
phrase “reasonable, articulable suspicion” was twelve years after Terry in
Brown v. Texas, as an unattributed quotation from the state’s brief. 443 U.S.
47, 51 (1979). The phrase was used to create common law first in the case
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983).
67. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S.
at 24).
68. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123; see also United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S.
1, 7 (1989).
69. The standard view in criminology is that arrests are a highly discretionary decision because they are dispersed, somewhat aleatory in timing, and
hence hard to supervise. See Geoffrey P. Alpert et al., Police Suspicion and
Discretionary Decision Making During Citizen Stops, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 407,
408 (2005); see also Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809,
817 (2015). Even where law imposes a duty on officers to make an arrest (for
example, in domestic violence cases), officers as a practical matter maintain a
measure of discretion as to what to do.
70. See Meares, supra note 59, at 175.
71. Fagan Report, supra note 51, at 18, 19 tbl.1; see also supra text accompanying notes 7–11 (citing stop rates in New York and Chicago).
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despite the existence of a court-supervised consent decree. The
analysis in this Section is focused on SQF as deployed en
masse.
SQF has similarities to, and can overlap somewhat with,
73
the strategy of “broken windows” or “quality of life” policing.
But the tactics are distinct. Whereas broken windows policing
relies on arrests “to remove undesirable persons from a neigh74
75
borhood,” SQF can involve a relatively low rate of arrests.
SQF tends to be a direct response to violent crime. It is not a
prophylactic response to the possibility that the sight of “bro76
ken windows” will induce escalating forms of disorder. Hence,
criticisms of “broken windows” policing cannot be translated to
SQF in any mechanical fashion.
One more detail is essential to my functional definition of
SQF: within a city, SQF is typically employed with greatest in77
tensity on a small subset of neighborhoods. Typically, its deployment is highest in neighborhoods characterized by “concentrated poverty” where crime rates tend to be higher than in
78
other parts of the city. In Chicago, for example, one study of

72. Plaintiffs’ Fifth Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices at 20, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2015),
https://www.aclupa.org/download_file/view_inline/2230/198.
73. Amanda Geller, The Process Is Still the Punishment: Low-Level Arrests in the Broken Windows Era, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1025, 1029–31 (2016)
(distinguishing the two approaches); see also Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse Relationship Between the Constitutionality and Effectiveness of New York City
“Stop and Frisk,” 94 B.U. L. REV. 1495, 1504–07 (2014) (same).
74. George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police
and Neighborhood Safety, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), http://www.theatlantic
.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465.
75. Geller, supra note 73, at 1032 (noting, based on New York data, that
“relatively few street stops lead to arrest”). That said, broken windows policing
and a concomitant rise in the rate of arrests tend to be geographically collocated with SQF.
76. See Kelling & Wilson, supra note 74. A decisive critique is offered in
BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN
WINDOWS POLICING 166–80 (2001).
77. David Weisburd et al., Could Innovations in Policing Have Contributed to the New York City Crime Drop Even in a Period of Declining Police
Strength? The Case of Stop, Question and Frisk as a Hot Spots Policing Strategy, 31 JUST. Q. 129, 141, 142 tbl.1 (2014) (finding that five percent of intersections in New York produced about fifty percent of SQFs in 2009 and fifty-six
percent in 2010).
78. For empirical evidence, see Ruth D. Peterson & Lauren J. Krivo,
Macrostructural Analyses of Race, Ethnicity, and Violent Crime: Recent Lessons and New Directions for Research, 31 ANN. REV. SOC. 331, 347–52 (2005);
Ronald C. Kramer, Poverty, Inequality, and Youth Violence, 567 ANNALS AM.

2412

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:2397

stops in 2014 found 266 stops per 1000 residents in the AfricanAmerican neighborhood of Englewood, but 43 stops per 1000
79
residents in the white neighborhood of Lincoln/Foster.
In particular, SQF tends to be concentrated upon minority—i.e., African-American and Hispanic—neighborhoods. In
New York, the district court in Floyd found that the racial
composition of a neighborhood was a better predictor of the
80
density of stops than its lagged crime rate. And at the height
of New York’s SQF, an African-American resident of New York
City had a ninety-two percent chance of being stopped in a sin81
gle year period.
SQF, in short, is not just a high-frequency policing strategy, it is also a highly geographically concentrated one in minority (African-American and Hispanic) neighborhoods. So even if
it entails a low rate of arrest, therefore, it is likely that SQF at
least contributes to the exceedingly high rates of minority ar82
rests in the jurisdictions in which it is deployed.
In summary, SQF is best understood as the large-scale use
of Terry stops in predominantly black and Hispanic urban
neighborhoods in response to violent crime. Its architects are
83
cognizant of, and indeed embrace, this racial asymmetry. But
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 123, 124–25 (2000).
79. STOP AND FRISK IN CHICAGO, supra note 7, at 9.
80. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2013);
see also Fagan Report, supra note 51, at 3–4 (explaining neighborhood differences).
81. AMY E. LERMAN & VESLA M. WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP: THE
DEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN CRIME CONTROL 41 (2014).
82. About forty-nine percent of black men and forty-four percent of Latino
men will be arrested by age twenty-three. Robert Brame et al., Demographic
Patterns of Cumulative Arrest Prevalence by Ages 18 and 23, 60 CRIME &
DELINQ. 471, 478 (2014).
83. See, e.g., Shane Dixon Kavanaugh, Commissioner Kelly Says Almost
75% of Violent Crime Committed by African-Americans, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(May 2, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/commissioner-kelly
-defends-stop-and-frisk-targeting-african-americans-article-1.1332840#
ixzz2UiHaXcKt; Ray Kelly, Ray Kelly: The NYPD: Guilty of Saving 7,383
Lives, WALL ST. J. (July 22, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412
7887324448104578616333588719320; Azi Paybarah, Ray Kelly: By the Department’s Count, African-Americans Are Being Understopped, POLITICO (May
2, 2013), http://www.politico.com/states/new-york/city-hall/story/2013/05/ray
-kelly-by-the-departments-count-african-americans-are-being-understopped
-000000; see also Heather Mac Donald, How To Increase the Crime Rate Nationwide, WALL ST. J. (June 11, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424127887324063304578525850909628878 (defending racially disparate street policing on the ground that “the preponderance of crime perpetrators, and victims, in New York are also minorities”).
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rather than dwelling on whether their views should be ranked
as invidious discrimination, I engage in a more consequentialist
inquiry: I consider the gains and the harms from SQF. These, I
contend, must be understood in light of geographic and historical context to be appreciated properly. It is the benefits of SQF
that I focus upon first before considering costs.
B. THE CRIME-CONTROL BENEFITS OF SQF IN CONTEXT
1. The Case for SQF
Aggressive use of street stops at a high volume has a long
84
historical pedigree. By 1969, they had become so endemic that
the Kerner Commission, established by President Johnson to
investigate the 1967 urban riots, singled out the police’s exces85
sive use of investigative stops and the “wholesale harassment
by certain elements of the police community, of which minority
86
groups, particularly Negros, frequently complain.” Today’s
fires are residues of yesterday’s conflagrations.
SQF in its modern form is a direct response to an uptick of
violent crime in the 1980s collocated with what William Julius
87
Wilson called the persistence of “ghetto poverty.” The political
sponsors of the policy consistently identified violent crime con-

84. The earliest programmatic use of SQF I have been able to identify occurred in Cincinnati’s Avondale neighborhood in 1958. Alex Elkins, The Origins of Stop-and-Frisk, JACOBIN (May 9, 2015), http://www.jacobinmag.com/
2015/05/stop-and-frisk-dragnet-ferguson-baltimore. SQF was subsequently
used in cities such as San Francisco in the 1960s. CHRISTOPHER LOWEN AGEE,
THE STREETS OF SAN FRANCISCO: POLICING AND THE CREATION OF A COSMOPOLITAN LIBERAL POLITICS, 1950–72, at 35–39 (2014). During most of the
twentieth century, however, the use of street patrols was in the decline. Eric
H. Monkkonen, History of Urban Policing, 15 CRIME & JUST. 547, 554 (1992).
Up to the 1960s, policing was “primarily reactive,” an orientation modified by
the rise of community policing. James J. Willis, A Recent History of the Police,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLICE AND POLICING 3, 6–7 (Michael D. Reisig
& Robert J. Kane eds., 2014). A 1966 study of Chicago police, for example,
found they spent one percent of their time proactively stopping people, fourteen percent of their time reacting to the public’s calls, and eighty-five percent
of their time on unstructured random patrols. Lawrence W. Sherman, The
Rise of Evidence-Based Policing: Targeting, Testing, and Tracking, 42 CRIM &
JUST. 377, 378 (2013).
85. NAT’L ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 158–61 (1968).
86. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968).
87. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF
THE NEW URBAN POOR 12 (1996).
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88

trol as its core aim. Because violent crime is disproportionately committed by African Americans and concentrated in black
neighborhoods, they argued, it is no surprise that SQF focuses
89
on those predominantly minority neighborhoods. Rather than
proof of anti-minority animus, the use of SQF is evidence for
this view that police are exerting special efforts to protect minorities from crime. The persuasive force of this argument from
crime control is the subject of this subpart while the tally of
SQF’s costs is addressed in the following subpart.
The genesis of an argument for SQF’s crime-control benefits is found in the early 1990s. In 1994, the sociologist James
Q. Wilson published an influential opinion piece in the New
York Times entitled “Just Take Away Their Guns,” a phrase
90
that succinctly encapsulated the distinctive appeal of SQF.
Wilson argued for the aggressive use of Terry stops as a means
to “reduce the number of people who carry guns unlawfully, especially in places—on streets, in taverns—where the mere
91
presence of a gun can increase the hazards we all face.” His
call responded directly to what by any measure was a grave crisis of law and order. At the time, New York City was suffering
92
from a high homicide rate. Of the 1951 murders that occurred
in New York in 1993, the year ending as Wilson wrote, more
93
than 1500 were committed by firearm.
Wilson’s call for aggressive street policing as a prophylaxis
for gun violence found a measure of empirical support the following year. In 1995, the criminologist Lawrence Sherman and
colleagues published the results of a quasi-experiment conducted for twenty-nine weeks in Kansas City of gun-based, intensive street policing and found a forty-nine percent decline in
94
gun crimes without any spillover to neighboring areas.
88. See Leo Eisenstein & Laura Gottesdiener, Why Michael Bloomberg Is
Wrong About Stop-and-Frisk, ROLLING STONE (May 22, 2013), http://www
.rollingstone.com/politics/news/why-michael-bloomberg-is-wrong-about-stop
-and-frisk-20130522 (“Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Police Commissioner
Ray Kelly have dismissed these concerns, claiming that stop-and-frisk has
dramatically reduced the city’s murder rate.”).
89. See sources cited supra note 80.
90. James Q. Wilson, Just Take Away Their Guns, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20,
1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/20/magazine/just-take-away-their
-guns.html?pagewanted=all.
91. Id.
92. Benjamin Bowling, The Rise and Fall of New York Murder, 39 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 531, 534 (1999).
93. Id. at 534 fig.1, 535 fig.2.
94. Lawrence W. Sherman & Dennis P. Rogan, Effects of Gun Seizures on
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Results of this kind prompted “[s]cores of cities [to] rush[]
95
to follow the Kansas City model” by seizing upon SQF as a
tool for lowering violent crime rates. The earliest adopter of
SQF, New York City, seems to have begun aggressive use of
Terry stops (as distinct from “broken windows” policing) around
1994. A parallel aggressive use of stops in Philadelphia came to
public attention in 2000 after a scandal involving hundreds of
unlawful arrests, searches, and prosecutions in the 39th Police
District led to the disclosure of incident reports showing a high
96
rate of illegal stops.
In the early 1990s, constitutional litigation over Chicago’s
“gang loitering” ordinance in part hinged on the 42,000 stops
97
executed under that measure over three years. The Chicago
Police Department’s limited collection of information about its
stops and frisks meant that it was not until 2015 that data
emerged showing that the city’s SQF intensity had exceeded its
usage patterns of the 1990s (and, incidentally, also overshot
98
New York City’s per capita stop rates).
Crucially, the policing strategy endorsed by Wilson, and
implicitly supported by the Kansas City evidence, does not lend
itself to uniform application across entire cities. Violent crime
in urban contexts has long been closely correlated with a subset
of geographic areas typically characterized by concentrated
99
poverty. In turn, concentrated urban poverty, both in the
1990s and today, is not evenly spread across racial ethnic
groups. Rather, it is a disproportionately minority phenome-

Gun Violence: “Hot Spots” Patrol in Kansas City, 12 JUST. Q. 673, 684 (1995).
95. Meares, supra note 1, at 340; accord Bellin, supra note 73, at 1505
(“[T]he NYPD uses stop-and-frisk to find guns and deter gun-carrying.”).
96. Complaint ¶¶ 83–84, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D.
Pa. 2010), https://www.aclupa.org/download_file/view_inline/669/198.
97. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 49 (1999). Ten years earlier,
another class action alleged that Chicago police would improperly “arrest, . . .
charge and . . . detain . . . persons for disorderly conduct . . . with no intent to
prosecute such charges in court.” Thompson v. City of Chicago, 104 F.R.D. 404,
404 (N.D. Ill. 1984). Approximately 100,000 people were arrested in these operations. STOP AND FRISK IN CHICAGO, supra note 7, at 5.
98. STOP AND FRISK IN CHICAGO, supra note 7, at 6, 11.
99. There is an enormous empirical literature to this effect. A useful
summary is Janet J. Lauritsen & Robert J. Sampson, Minorities, Crime, and
Criminal Justice, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 58, 65–70
(Michael Tonry ed., 1998); Peterson & Krivo, supra note 78; Robert J.
Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCI. 918, 919, 923 (1997).
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non. Not only impoverished African Americans but also black
middle-class cohorts are disproportionately represented in ex101
tremely poor urban neighborhoods. One side effect of this is
that urban violent crime impacts minority groups more griev102
ously than non-minority groups. In 1993, the year before
James Wilson wrote his Times op-ed, the African-American
homicide victimization rate per 100,000 population was 47; the
103
white rate was 6.4. From the perspective of its political sponsors, SQF has to train upon African-American and Hispanic
neighborhoods not because of some theory of race and crime but
because that is where the murders—the murders of minority
104
citizens—are happening.
If American cities were making progress toward meaningful racial integration, this nexus between policing and race
might be expected to have waned by today. But despite increasing ethnic and racial diversity within cities, racial segregation
105
endures in many cities. Indeed, as many American cities are
100. See Glenn Firebaugh & Chad R. Farrell, Still Large, but Narrowing:
The Sizable Decline in Racial Neighborhood Inequality in Metropolitan America, 1980–2010, 53 DEMOGRAPHY 139, 144 (2016) (analyzing data from 1980 to
2010 and finding a “greater concentration of blacks and Hispanics in poorerthan-average neighborhoods” in urban contexts); see also ROBERT J. SAMPSON,
GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE ENDURING NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT
(2012) (describing racial character of concentrated poverty in Chicago). For
correlations between poverty, crime, and racial segregation, see Edward S.
Shihadeh & Nicole Flynn, Segregation and Crime: The Effect of Black Social
Isolation on the Rates of Black Urban Violence, 74 SOC. FORCES 1325, 1345
(1996) (“[S]egregation is a major predictor of the rates of homicide and robbery
among blacks.”).
101. Lincoln Quillian, Segregation and Poverty Concentration: The Role of
Three Segregations, 77 AM. SOC. REV. 354, 354–55 (2012) (finding that black
poverty concentration stems from the complex interaction of racial segregation, poverty-status segregation within race, and segregation of blacks from
high- and middle-income members of other racial groups).
102. Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows:
Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 474
(2000) (“In urban areas, many poor people of color live in conditions of residential segregation, concentrated poverty, and unemployment that predict the
breakdown of community social processes, which in turn predict elevated
crime rates.”).
103. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 10
fig.1.5 (2007).
104. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 591
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (describing defendant’s argument that “the apparently disproportionate stopping of blacks and Hispanics can be explained on race-neutral
grounds by police deployment to high crime areas and by racial differences in
crime rates”).
105. See John R. Logan et al., Segregation of Minorities in the Metropolis:
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as “hypersegregated” today as they were in 1970. The experience of residential segregation, moreover, has remained especially stable for African Americans regardless of class. Nationally, the proportion of African-American areas lacking racial
diversity has “remained stubbornly set at around 8.6 percent”
107
throughout the 1990s. Even “relatively advantaged” black
neighborhoods “continue to be unique in the degree to which
they are spatially linked with communities of severe concen108
trated disadvantage.”
The argument in favor of SQF, in short, rests on its ability
to mitigate the costs of violent crime particularly associated
with urban minority-dominated neighborhoods. To the extent
that areas of concentrated poverty persist in cities, and to the
extent they are predominantly black or Hispanic, SQF might
even be viewed as a form of affirmative action. It is a positive
subsidy to impoverished minority communities, a surplus provision of the public good of policing. In former New York police
Commissioner Ray Kelly’s words, the real problem with urban
policing is then that African Americans “are being
understopped” in light of the violent crime experienced by black
109
communities.
2. The Difficulties of SQF as Violent Crime Control
The benefits of SQF, however, are more qualified than its
advocates suggest. I analyze here how those benefits are
properly characterized before turning to the policy’s costs. FoTwo Decades of Change, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 1, 7 (2004) (finding that despite
modest declines in racial segregation, blacks remain more segregated from
whites than Hispanics or Asians).
106. Douglas S. Massey & Jonathan Tannen, A Research Note on Trends in
Black Hypersegregation, 52 DEMOGRAPHY 1025, 1027–28 (2015).
107. Steven R. Holloway et al., The Racially Fragmented City? Neighborhood Racial Segregation and Diversity Jointly Considered, 64 PROF. GEOGRAPHER 63, 69–70 (2012).
108. Patrick Sharkey, Spatial Segmentation and the Black Middle Class,
119 AM. J. SOC. 903, 905–06 (2014).
109. Paybarah, supra note 83; accord sources cited supra note 83. For
scholarly defenses of SQF and its effect on violent crime, see David Rudovsky
& Lawrence Rosenthal, Debate, The Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk in
New York City, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 117, 141 (2013) (describing Rosenthal’s endorsement of SQF on public safety grounds); Bellin, supra note 73, at
1538 (“[A] high volume of arbitrary frisks is essential to effectively deterring
gun possession.”). Bellin’s position, however, is more nuanced and careful than
Rosenthal’s insofar as he concludes that SQF is not narrowly tailored as required by the application of strict scrutiny under Equal Protection doctrine.
Id. at 1546.
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cusing solely upon SQF’s suppression of violent crime, there are
both reasons for skepticism of the magnitude of the ensuing
welfare gain and grounds for treating such benefits as morally
problematic. These concerns, I stress, bear on SQF’s efficacy,
not the moral urgency of addressing the hecatomb of contemporary urban homicide in cities such as Chicago today.
If there is no convincing evidence that SQF in fact meaningfully improves policing outcome—and if there is also evidence that it has substantial deleterious effects—then it should
be considered a moral wrong in the same class as employment
discrimination or housing segregation. Moreover, evidence that
SQF imposes concentrated costs on minority populations without remotely commensurate benefits points toward the need for
a distinct, programmatic remedy such as disparate impact liability.
I highlight four interrelated grounds for concern. First, the
evidence for an absolute crime-control effect from SQF is surprisingly fragile. Second, the evidence of a marginal effect from
SQF in comparison to other methods is nonexistent. What evidence exists suggests many of the crime-control benefits of SQF
might be obtained without its aggregate, racially disparate aspect. Third, and relatedly, the claim that SQF disproportionately benefits African Americans rests on complex and controversial assumptions. Finally, even assuming firm evidence of large
crime-control gains from SQF, there is a normative objection to
the state taking credit for those benefits when the governmental entities responsible for SQF also contributed to minority
segregation into neighborhoods of concentrated poverty.
First, notwithstanding Sherman’s Kansas City study, “it is
110
very difficult to connect [SQF] to any crime reduction.” Two
subsequent efforts at replicating the former study, in Indianap111
olis and Pittsburgh, have produced ambivalent results. The
Indianapolis study, for example, found that homicide rates decreased in one of two treatment areas, but remained unchanged
112
in the other. Its authors concluded that the “present state of

110. Meares, supra note 1, at 344.
111. CHARLES R. EPP ET AL., PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE
RACE AND CITIZENSHIP 32–33 (2014) (describing and discussing both studies).
112. Edmund F. McGarrell, Steven Chermak, Alexander Weiss & Jeremy
Wilson, Reducing Firearms Violence Through Directed Police Patrol, 1 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 119, 136–37 (2001).
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knowledge does not allow us to answer the theoretical ques113
tions of what produced the effects observed in Kansas City.”
A meta-analysis of six policing experiments involving increased police patrols in North and South America reexamined
the Pittsburgh data. This data found that while the earlier
studies had found a statistically significant reduction in gun violence, alternative specifications “strongly suggest[] the estimated drop in shots-fired incidents was due at least in part to a
114
preintervention trend, a seasonal pattern, or chance.” Nevertheless, the authors of the meta-study found themselves ultimately “generally favorable” to the method pioneered in Kansas
City, even as they raised substantial concern as to whether
Sherman’s experiment could be scaled up beyond the level of
115
small neighborhoods.
In an operational context, SQF fares less well. Rigorous
empirical studies of SQF’s post-1994 deployment are rare. Existing results, though, provide sparse support for its crimecontrol effects. For example, a study of the effects of SQF on
burglary and robbery rates in New York between 2003 and
116
Another quantitative
2010 found “few significant effects.”
study of New York found that “the number of shooting incidents was virtually unchanged during the years in which stops
and frisks grew at an extraordinary rate,” suggesting that it
was “extremely unlikely that these stops could have reduced
117
the homicide rate by reducing gun ownership or carrying.”

113. Id. at 145.
114. Christopher S. Koper & Evan Mayo-Wilson, Police Crackdowns on Illegal Gun Carrying: A Systematic Review of Their Impact on Gun Crime, 2 J.
EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 227, 238, 245–46 (2006).
115. Id. at 248–49.
116. Richard Rosenfeld & Robert Fornango, The Impact of Police Stops on
Precinct Robbery and Burglary Rates in New York City, 2003–2010, 31 JUST.
Q. 96, 97 (2012). Rosenberg and Fornango persuasively argue that a 2008
study that did find a negative relation between SQF and crime was methodologically flawed because it failed to include precinct-level socioeconomic effects
or year fixed effects. Id. at 103.
117. David F. Greenberg, Studying New York City’s Crime Decline: Methodological Issues, 31 JUST. Q. 154, 181–82 (2014); accord Jeffrey A. Fagan et
al., Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited: The Demography and Logic of
Proactive Policing in a Safe and Changing City, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING: NEW AND ESSENTIAL READINGS 309 (Stephen K. Rice & Michael D.
White eds., 2010) (reporting study findings that increased rates of police stops
and decreased efficiency of those stops disproportionately affects particular
neighborhoods).
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The most detailed and comprehensive study of overall
trends in recent crime rates in New York, by Franklin Zimring,
also concluded that in the New York City context, “there is no
way to separately measure the value added by aggressive in118
tervention in New York City.”
A leading criminologist and the paramount expect on New
York policing, Zimring has seemed of two minds about street
policing in general. On the one hand, he has identified “aggressive” measures such as hot-spot policing, the elimination of
open-air drug markets, and firearm reduction as “probably”
119
successful. On the other hand, he has been much more confident that “data driven crime mapping and patrol strategy
management” and the hiring of police officers did likely have
120
large and negative effects on crime rates. At the very best,
Zimring’s evidence leaves open the possibility that SQF had
some role to play in crime reduction. It casts little light on the
magnitude of that role, and it has little to say about whether
the same gains in public order might have been achieved
through alternate means.
Another potential means of examining SQF’s impact is to
examine the aftermath of the policy’s unexpected discontinuance. But there has also been no detailed study of what happened after the New York City Police Department reduced the
number of stops dramatically in 2013. In the three years after
that decline began, however, murder rates have remained “es121
sentially flat.”
In Chicago, a different and more complicated story prevails. A sharp rise in murder and decline in arrests followed the
November 2015 release of long-suppressed video footage of a fatal police shooting that provoked sharp public outcry against
122
the Chicago Police Department. Immediately thereafter, in

118. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE: NEW YORK’S
LESSONS FOR URBAN CRIME AND ITS CONTROL 148–49 (2012).
119. Id. at 145.
120. Id. at 147–48. I am grateful to John Rappaport for discussion on this
point.
121. Toni Monkovic, Ted Cruz Was Wrong on Murders in New York, but
Perception Is Hard To Shake, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes
.com/2016/04/22/upshot/ted-cruz-was-wrong-on-murders-in-new-york-but
-perception-is-hard-to-shake.html.
122. Rob Arthur & Jeff Asher, Gun Violence Spiked—and Arrests Declined—in Chicago Right After the Laquan McDonald Video Release,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 11, 2016), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/gun
-violence-spiked-and-arrests-declined-in-chicago-right-after-the-laquan
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January 2016, changes to how stops and frisks are recorded—
123
but no change to operational policy—went into effect. Given
that the highly critical public reaction to the video likely had a
significant effect on multiple aspects of police morale and hence
police behavior, it is hard to disentangle any discrete effect
from changes in SQF policy from changes due to the critical
public reaction to the demoralizing release of evidence of unlawful police violence. Those who rush to judgment or seek to
cast blame based on the Chicago (or New York) data trends
may well be ensnared unwittingly in a species of motivated
reasoning.
The empirical case for a crime-control benefit from SQF, in
124
short, does not stand on strong foundations. While there is
some empirical support for an effect from SQF in small-scale
experiments, there is no existing evidence that this effect can
125
be replicated at a citywide level. The weakness of its evidentiary predicate contrasts with firmer evidentiary basis for other
kinds of reform, including the deployment of more officers and
the use of more data-driven approaches. More than forty years
after Wilson’s initial intervention, therefore, SQF remains
largely predicated on a mere prediction about the effect of intensive street stops on violent crime levels.
Second, econometric studies of SQF’s effect on crime of the
kind discussed above aim to isolate the marginal effect of the
policy after controlling for all other relevant variables. In effect,
they strive to hold all else constant and then search for an ef-mcdonald-video-release.
123. See id.
124. At least one commentator cites a 2006 study of a multi-pronged antinarcotics strategy in New York City public housing as evidence of the efficacy
of SQF. Lawrence Rosenthal, The Limits of Second Amendment Originalism
and the Constitutional Case for Gun Control, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1187, 1251,
n.295 (2015). But the study in question involved a program that “combined
several strategies in a comprehensive design to prevent and control drug use:
police enforcement, drug treatment, drug prevention, coordination of services
with health and social service agencies, and development of the social infrastructure of formal and informal supervision groups in the housing authorities.” Jeffrey Fagan et al., The Paradox of the Drug Elimination Program in
New York City Public Housing, 13 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 415, 417
(2006). It is plainly incorrect to rely on this sort of multi-pronged effort, in
which the effects of one policy might be contingent on the manner in which
another is operationalized as a basis for drawing inferences about the narrower tactic of SQF.
125. For a challenge to the small-scale effects, see EPP ET AL., supra note
111, at 153–54 (“Nor is it clear that investigatory stops help reduce the crime
rate . . . .”).
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fect of SQF on crime rates. But the assumption that all else
remains constant is an obvious artifice. A police force that foregoes SQF is likely to employ an alternative policing strategy
that does not involve nonconsensual interventions or facially
racial disparities in treatment. The marginal negative effect on
crime-control of shifting from SQF to an alternative modality of
policing is likely to be smaller than the absolute effect of simply
foregoing SQF entirely. A police force that chooses to forego
SQF can redeploy the substantial personnel resources that it
occupies for other tactical uses.
There are, moreover, other modalities of policing that are
positively associated with crime control in rigorous empirical
studies. Consider, for example, the empirical literature on “hotspot policing,” a technique that has some parallels with SQF,
but that can also be distinguished from it. Hot-spot policing involves “the application of police interventions at very small ge126
ographic units of analysis.” A range of studies and metastudies suggests that the highly localized deployment of officers
has a meaningful and statistically significant effect on crime
127
rates.
Hot-spot policing and SQF have some similarities, but
their differences are critical. To begin, there is a question of
scale. I have already stressed more than once that SQF (as I
use the term) involves tens or hundreds of thousands of arrests.
Hot-spot policing does not require similarly massive deployments. The one study of an existing SQF policy to consider the
question concluded that deployments tended to occur across areas that were too large to be characterized as “hot spots” as
128
that term is technically used. Even if the distinction in scale
126. ANTHONY A. BRAGA & DAVID L. WEISBURD, POLICING PROBLEM PLAC9 (2010). More generally, proactive policing of various kinds (not necessarily involving stops) is also associated with crime-control effects. Charis E.
Kubrin et al., Proactive Policing and Robbery Rates Across U.S. Cities, 48
CRIMINOLOGY 57, 62 (2010).
127. Cody W. Telep & David Weisburd, What Is Known About the Effectiveness of Police Practices in Reducing Crime and Disorder?, 15 POLICE Q.
331, 333–34 (2012) (“The evidence base for hot spots policing is particularly
strong . . . .”). For exemplary studies using randomized and controlled experiments, see Anthony A. Braga & Brenda J. Bond, Policing Crime and Disorder
Hot Spots: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 577 (2008); Anthony A. Braga et al., Problem-Oriented Policing in Violent Crime Places: A
Randomized Control Experiment, 37 CRIMINOLOGY 541 (1999).
128. Fagan & Geller, supra note 11, at 79–80. This factor can also be used
in inapposite and illogical ways. Id. at 85 (noting that “High Crime Area” was
often provided as a justification for stops in public housing putatively targetES
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between SQF and hot-spot policing is hard to quantify, in prac129
tice it seems easy enough to draw.
Moreover, hot-spot policing does not require stops, let alone
frisks or arrests to be effective. There is instead evidence that
“increased police presence alone” dampens crime rates, and the
“strongest” impact is associated with “situational prevention”
strategies, that “disrupt situational dynamics that allow crime
130
to occur,” for example by “razing abandoned buildings.” One
study of street stops at “microgeographic” hot spots examined
in one-week increments in New York generated reductions in
crime, but cautioned that “evidence suggests that crime prevention can be achieved without resorting to an unrestricted SQF
131
policy.” In this New York data, moreover, SQF was pursued
“at the expense” of other strategies, leaving open questions
132
about the “potential of other policing strategies.”
Hot spot policing plainly requires a nontrivial number of
officers. So it is important to emphasize that my argument here
solely concerns the style of policing, not the sheer volume of of133
ficers deployed. And increasing stops or arrests, do not appear to be a necessary component of hot-spot policing. To the
contrary, in one leading study, the authors noted approvingly
that officers in the treatment condition (i.e., engaged in hoting trespassers, but without any explanation of why the suspicion of trespass
arose).
129. In Part I.B infra, I develop a catalog of costs associated with SQF.
Many of these costs flow from the sheer volume and concentration of stops.
Because hot-spot policing is more focused, many of these criticisms do not apply to it. This is another reason to distinguish hot-spot policing and SQF qua
urban policing strategies.
130. Telep & Weisburd, supra note 127, at 333–41; accord Braga & Bond,
supra note 127, at 599 (reporting results from a controlled, randomized study
in Lowell, Massachusetts, and suggesting that the strongest crime-prevention
benefits were driven by situational strategies that attempted to modify the
criminal opportunity structure at crime and disorder hot-spot locations).
131. David Weisburd et al., Do Stop, Question and Frisk Practices Deter
Crime? Evidence at Microunits of Space and Time, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL’Y 31, 48–49 (2015); id. at 47 (noting that in their estimate, high-volume
use of SFQ would produce “only a 2% decline in crime,” which they characterize as “relatively small”).
132. Id. at 49–50. Another study conducted by Weisburd similarly finds
“modest” effects that are concentrated in space and time. Alese Wooditch &
David Weisburd, Using Space-Time Analysis To Evaluate Criminal Justice
Programs: An Application to Stop-Question-Frisk Practices, 32 J. QUANT.
CRIM. 191, 191 (2015).
133. Cf. Steven D. Levitt, Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring To Estimate the Effects of Police on Crime: Reply, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1244, 1244
(2002) (presenting evidence of a “large, negative impact of police on crime”).
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spot policing) were not evaluated on their stop count, but rather were held “accountable for reducing citizen calls for service
and for ameliorating social and physical incivilities in targeted
134
hot-spot areas.” A recent meta-analysis of nineteen studies of
hot-spot policing separately examined the effects of two distinct
versions of that policy that involved either increasing the volume of traditional policing or using a problem-solving ap135
proach. Three of the ten existing studies of the traditional po136
licing model found small positive effects on crime reduction.
But the overall mean effect size of problem-oriented hot-spot
policing was twice the effect size of the traditional policing
137
model. It would seem that the decision to simply increase
traditional policing activities at hot spots is dominated in practice by problem-solving measures.
The contrast between SQF and hot-spot policing usefully
underscores a more general point: policing is not a single, undifferentiated public good. Rather, policing is mutative and
takes several forms. It can entail the pursuit of diverse ends of
crime-control, order-maintenance, and social provision, with di138
vergent tools. Police forces now engaged in SQF have at other
times employed other, quite different approaches, which focus
139
140
community relations,
or
instead on service provision,
prophylactic street policing. Some of these policies aim to reduce crime; others, such as community policing, seek to “build[]
141
a reservoir of public support” to tap in moments of strain.
These different services can be bundled in different ways. In at
least some of the jurisdictions in which SQF is employed,
neighborhoods subject to aggressive street policing do not nec134. Braga & Bond, supra note 127, at 599.
135. Anthony A. Braga et al., The Effects of Hot Spot Policing on Crime: An
Updated Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 31 JUST. Q. 633, 640, 655–56
(2014).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 656.
138. For an excellent survey of diverse views on the police function, see
THE FUTURE OF POLICING (Jennifer M. Brown ed., 2014).
139. See, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR: THE
MANAGEMENT OF LAW AND ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES 200–26 (1968) (describing a “service style” of policing).
140. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Praying for Community Policing, 90 CAL.
L. REV. 1593 (2002) (describing an effort by police in Chicago to build relations
with African-American churches).
141. WESLEY G. SKOGAN, POLICE AND COMMUNITY IN CHICAGO: A TALE OF
THREE CITIES 247 (2006) (discussing community policing in Chicago in the
early 1990s).
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essarily receive high levels of other policing services. Indeed,
racial segregation at the municipal level is systematically cor143
related to depressed levels of public service provision.
In Chicago, for example, African-American and Hispanic
neighborhoods are subject to SQF on the one hand, but on the
other hand experience substantially longer delays than non144
minority neighborhoods when seeking police aid via 911 calls.
Policing is thus both under-supplied and over-provided simultaneously.
Defenders of SQF therefore mislead when they equate SQF
with a police force “focus[ing] its resources where people most
145
need protection.” Rather, it is both possible—and in fact often
seems to be the case—that SQF is accompanied by serious deficiencies in respect to other elements of the bundle of police services. Estimation of the margin costs of ending SQF must as a
result account for the possibility of variance across these other
elements of the police function.
Third, the assumption of SQF’s advocates, particularly in
New York, has been that its benefits accrue to the minority residents of high-crime neighborhoods more than they accrue to
146
residents of low-crime neighborhoods. Implicitly, these advocates are drawing a comparison between SQF and affirmative
action. Both, they suggest, are policies that disproportionately
benefit African-American and Hispanic minorities.
But consider another possibility: since the 1960s, the fear
of crime has been a concern that has powerfully mobilized
147
white electorates. It may be that among the gains of SQF is a
148
reduction in the fear of crime, and that this gain is diffused
142. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF INTEGRATION 41–42
(2010) (noting disparate access to public-order resources in cities such as Los
Angeles).
143. Jessica Trounstine, Segregation and Inequality in Public Goods, 60
AM. J. POL. SCI, 709, 720 (2016).
144. Cent. Austin Neighborhood Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 1 N.E.3d 976 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2013) (describing longer wait times for 911 calls in minority neighborhoods).
145. Mac Donald, supra note 83.
146. See sources cited supra note 83.
147. See Vesla M. Weaver, Frontlash: Race and the Development of Punitive Crime Policy, 21 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 230, 235 (2007); see also Dennis D.
Loo & Ruth-Ellen M. Grimes, Polls, Politics, and Crime: The “Law and Order”
Issue of the 1960s, 5 W. CRIMINOLOGY REV. 50, 50 (2004) (discussing origins of
public concerns about crime in the 1960s).
148. See generally Jonathan P. Jackson, A Psychological Perspective on
Vulnerability in the Fear of Crime, 15 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 365 (2009) (exam-
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among the wider urban population. The latter, of course, is typically much larger than the urban subpopulation subject to
SQF. Even assuming there is a substantial marginal crime149
control gain in substituting SQF for the next-best policy, it is
necessarily the case that whereas the (predominantly minority)
residents of impoverished neighborhoods experience both costs
and benefits, the (predominantly white) non-residents of other
neighborhoods experience only benefits (albeit in expectation at
a much lower rate). There are also likely to be many more
white non-residents of targeted areas than minority nonresidents. The former group benefits from being able to access
more of the city, as well as from a more general reduction in
150
their fear of crime.
Depending on the magnitude of these various costs and
benefits for different racial groups, it is at least possible that
the adoption of SQF might create larger net benefits for the
class of white nonresidents as a whole than for the class of minority residents of highly policed neighborhoods in a manner
that is racially regressive—even without accounting for the po151
tential costs of SQF.
The claim that SQF disproportionately benefits minorities
is an important part of the moral case in favor of the policy.
Closer examination of the assumptions underlying the claim,
however, uncovers its contingency. It is hardly clear that—
again, even bracketing the costs of SQF—it is true that a disproportionate share of the social benefits of SQF run to minoriining factors that impact fear of crime).
149. But see supra text accompanying notes 126–30 (suggesting that hot
spot policing is better supported empirically as a crime-control measure than
SQF).
150. It seems likely to me that some non-minorities gain satisfaction from
policies that confirm their prior belief that minorities are responsible for social
ills such as crime, a belief that helps obscure the ways in which both national
and state social provision have long disproportionately benefited non-minority
populations. For the canonical historical analysis on this point, see IRA
KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HISTORY
OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2005). SQF, that is, is a
policy that simultaneously confirms racial resentment and assuages white
guilt. As such, it has large psychological payoffs for the correctly disposed nonminority populations. See also Michael Tesler, The Conditions Ripe for Racial
Spillover Effects, 26 ADVANCES POL. PSYCH. 101, 101 (2015) (summarizing evidence of continued high levels of racial resentment).
151. What if African-American residents subject to SQF do not benefit from
the policy and do not support it? If SQF nonetheless mitigates white fear of
crime, the policy will have an unmitigated regressive distributive effect. Steven N. Durlauf, Assessing Racial Profiling, 116 ECON. J. F402, F412 (2006).
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ty communities. Much depends on the welfare effects from
crime reductions and from mitigation of crime-related fears.
Fourth, the final reason for skepticism of the positive case
for SQF based on its crime-control effects is not based on empirical data or calculations of its welfare-related consequences.
Rather, it is moral in nature, and depends on a distinctive (and
controversial) moral logic: the idea that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his
own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to
152
acquire property by his own crime.”
Applying that concededly raw intuition to the case of SQF
reveals the following line of argument: The problem of violent
crime to which SQF responds flows from the existence of neighborhoods of concentrated (and racialized) poverty. Although
there are many forces molding the latter, governmental actors
at the state and local level have a large share of responsibility.
Those same governmental bodies (if not the exact same indi153
vidual politicians) also resorted to SQF.
But having exposed minority communities to the harm of
high violent crime rates, governmental bodies cannot then
“take advantage” of this wrong to seek a measure of legal and
policy leeway that they otherwise would not have. At a minimum, they should elect the policing strategy that imposes the
minimum burden on minority communities that as a result of
persisting state policy have been subjected to concentrated poverty and high crime rates. Policing, that is, should be subject to
a Hippocratic constraint.
The threshold premise of this argument—that states and
localities bear a measure of responsibility for concentrated, minority poverty—has substantial support in the historical and
empirical literature. To be sure, “macrostructural” forces such
as the deindustrialization of central cities and the exit of some
middle-class and wealthy African Americans have driven the
154
growth of concentrated, racialized poverty. But these forces
152. Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889).
153. In Chicago, the argument might well be personalized given the
lengthy tenure of Richard M. Daley in office.
154. Robert J. Sampson & William Julius Wilson, Toward a Theory of
Race, Crime, and Urban Inequality, in CRIME AND INEQUALITY 37, 42 (John
Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson eds., 1995). More recently, the financial crisis has
deepened the effect of segregation. Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Racial
Segregation and the American Foreclosure Crisis, 75 AM. SOC. REV. 629, 634
(2010) (“[T]he housing boom and the immense profits it generated frequently
came at the expense of poor minorities living in central cities and inner sub-
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have been magnified by “deliberate policy decisions to concen155
trate minorities and the poor in public housing.”
In Chicago, for example, alderman and the mayor thwarted
efforts from the 1940s onward to disperse African Americans
156
outside traditionally black neighborhoods. Across the country,
zoning restrictions and permitting requirements have been extensively deployed to perpetuate racially “exclusionary” resi157
dential patterns.
The implications of state involvement in the creation of
concentrated racialized poverty turn on the sort of moral fault
one attributes to a collective entity such as a municipality, the
precise mix of state action and private actions responsible for
residential segregation, and the extent to which any historical
responsibility is mitigated by the passage of time and the burdens that remediation would impose on innocent third158
parties. I do not aim to resolve that complex suite of questions here. Rather, my more limited claim is that a city’s claims
on behalf of SQF must at a minimum be contextualized by its
urbs who were targeted by specialized mortgage brokers and affiliates of national banks and subjected to discriminatory lending practices.”). The best historical case-study is Thomas Sugrue’s canonical history of post-war Detroit.
THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR DETROIT (1996).
155. Sampson & Wilson, supra note 154, at 43. See generally Erika K. Wilson, Leveling Localism and Racial Inequality Through the No Child Left Behind Act Public Choice Provision, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 625, 649–51 (2011)
(analyzing the ways in which explicit government policies caused racial residential segregation in the suburbs and urban cities). Such policies also existed
at the federal level. See DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993). For
a recent accounting in the legal scholarship, see Sarah Schindler, Architectural Exclusion: Discrimination and Segregation Through Physical Design of the
Built Environment, 124 YALE L.J. 1934, 1955–56 (2015) (discussing the role of
the Federal Housing Authority in fostering urban racial segregation).
156. See ARNOLD R. HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND GHETTO: RACE AND
HOUSING IN CHICAGO 1940–1960, at 23–24, 64–68, 222–23 (1983) (discussing
political resistance to the diffusion of public housing, motivated by opposition
to racial integration); accord D. BRADFORD HUNT, BLUEPRINT FOR DISASTER:
THE UNRAVELING OF CHICAGO PUBLIC HOUSING 85–86 (2009). Private violence
also played a large role in Chicago. HIRSCH, supra note 156, at 215–18.
157. See, e.g., Myron Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies To Reduce
Concentrated Poverty and Racial Segregation, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877,
888–89 (2006); Christopher Serkin & Leslie Wellington, Putting Exclusionary
Zoning in Its Place: Affordable Housing and Geographical Scale, 40 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1667, 1667–73 (2013).
158. An additional complication arises if a municipality that adopts SQF
simultaneously pursues policies that either entrench or preserve concentrated
minority poverty.
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general historical responsibility for the burdens imposed by
concentrated poverty, particularly on the racial minorities
whose efforts to move beyond that condition in search of employment and educational opportunities have so often been
159
thwarted. At an absolute minimum, it would seem appropriate to demand a heightened burden of proof for claims about
the benefits of disparate crime-control measures tendered by
the very entity responsible for racial segregation.
Stated in brief then, my fourth point is that the institutional author of racial segregation should do no further harm to
minorities when it addresses the costs of such segregation.
Having created the problem that SQF is intended to address,
municipalities have no entitlement to a benefit of empirical
doubt. More ambitiously, cities’ partial culpability for the underlying condition of concentrated poverty might justify a demand for special efforts to ensure that no policy response to
crime imposes a disproportionate share of costs on the legatees
of historical discrimination, or that denies them a disproportionate share of its benefits.
To summarize then, this Section has examined the crimecontrol benefits of SQF. The evidence for those is surprisingly
fragile. The case for thinking SQF has marginal benefits in
comparison to a next-best policy option such as hot-spot policing is even shakier. Accounting for SQF’s more diffuse effect on
the fear of crime, moreover, suggests that defenses of SQF as a
form of affirmative action may well fail. Finally, an analysis
based on the state’s historical responsibilities for the underlying conditions that motivate SQF suggests a need to view the
state’s celebration of the policy’s benefits with a measure of
skepticism.
C. THE ECOLOGICAL AND DYNAMIC COSTS OF SQF
This Section turns from SQF’s putative benefits to its costs.
In my view, SQF has an intertwined set of individual and collective costs that largely (but not exclusively) sound in an
equality-related rather than a Fourth Amendment register. My
starting assumption is that SQF’s costs, no less than its benefits, cannot be properly understood or evaluated once they are
detached from the historical origins of concentrated poverty.

159. On the difficulty of African-American exit from concentrated poverty
via economic improvement, see MARY PATILLO-MCCOY, BLACK PICKET FENCES: PRIVILEGE AND PERIL AMONG THE BLACK MIDDLE CLASS 24–27 (1999).

2430

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:2397

Nor can they be evaluated without thinking carefully about the
ways in which SQF might perpetuate the underlying conditions
of social and racial stratification into concentrated poverty. In
short, rather than analyzing racial discrimination as a “singlepoint outcome,” I embrace here the dominant emphasis in recent sociological scholarship on “modeling discrimination as a
160
process.”
I identify eight pathways by which SQF can impose harms
on individuals and communities defined by race. I began the
analysis of costs by focusing on the immediate encounter between police and an individual. Having documented costs in
that proximate context, I then widen my lens to capture a diverse array of adverse spillovers from that immediate encounter, not only to the individual, but also for his or her social network, and (for racial minorities) his or her larger racial cohort.
The latter effects of SQF, it should be noted, diffuse
161
through social networks and families. Several critically depend upon “vicious cycles,” or positive feedback mechanisms
162
that entangle individual and neighborhood-level effects, often
with regressive distributive consequences. More generally, it is
plausible to view all eight causal pathways as intertwined and,
to an extent, mutually reinforcing.
First, the Supreme Court in Terry recognized that even
brief stops and frisks have immediate and substantial costs.
Chief Justice Warren described even a temporary police stop as
“a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may
inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is
163
not to be undertaken lightly.” In subsequent cases, however,
the Court has tended to downplay the immediate psychological
164
and dignitary costs of being stopped.

160. Devah Pager & Hannah Shepherd, The Sociology of Discrimination in
Employment, Housing, Credit, and Consumer Markets, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 181,
188 (2008).
161. Because not all have been rigorously empirically tested, I will carefully identify what data exists respecting each pathway. Where data is absent, I
will offer (with appropriate caveats) reasoned hypotheses.
162. Mitchell Duneier argues that “the black ghetto has been the site of a
series of vicious cycles in which space plays a distinctive role.” MITCHELL
DUNEIER, GHETTO: THE INVENTION OF A PLACE, THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 223
(2016). I stress the role of neighborhood rather than “space” in the following.
163. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1968).
164. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Terry Unbound, 82 MISS. L.J. 329, 338–39
(2013).
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But ethnographic data and qualitative studies demonstrate
that Chief Justice Warren’s initial intuition was correct. The
immediate toll of a nonconsensual police intrusion—even absent physical content or formal consequence—is substantial.
Perhaps the best evidence derives from a recent survey of 1200
young men in New York conducted by Amanda Geller and colleagues. The latter found that contact with the police (primarily
in the form of Terry stops) was consistently associated with
persisting “stigma,” “trauma,” “anxiety,” and “depressive symp165
toms.”
On reflection, it should be no surprise that these effects
flow from a Terry stop. The latter is an unexpected encounter
with heavily armed police, typically characterized by a sense of
utter helplessness and a sharp fear of violence and deadly
166
force. This fear may be amplified by a worry of more prolonged detention, a real concern in a jurisdiction where police
167
have arrest quotas to fill. This psychological toll is not immediately visible. It may be shameful even to confess. These are,
perhaps, the least troubling explanations for why such costs
have largely fallen out of judicial accounts of SQF.
Second, a different, racial asymmetry afflicts judicial consideration of the risks of bodily harm attendant on a Terry stop.
On the one hand, the Court has punctiliously attended to the
168
risk of bodily harm to officers during a stop. On the other
hand, the Court has been largely silent about the possibility
that Terry stops expose the individual subject to police atten169
tion to a substantial risk of physical violence.
165. Amanda Geller et al., Aggressive Policing and the Mental Health of
Young Urban Men, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2321, 2321–22 (2014).
166. For a vivid account of the associated dignitary harms, see Nicholas K.
Pert, Why Is the N.Y.P.D. After Me?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2011), http://www
.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/opinion/sunday/young-black-and-frisked-by-the-nypd
.html (“Essentially, I incorporated into my daily life the sense that I might
find myself up against a wall or on the ground with an officer’s gun at my
head.”).
167. This may have been the case in New York. Joseph Goldstein, Stopand-Frisk Trial Turns to Claim of Arrest Quotas, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/nyregion/stop-and-frisk-trial-focuses-on
-claim-of-arrest-quotas.html (describing evidence that police officers were told
to meet quotas in New York City).
168. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414–415 (1997) (stressing
the risk of harm to officers while characterizing the cost to those under the
control of the officers of being physically moved as “minimal”).
169. The Fourth Amendment provides limited protection from non-deadly
force. The Court employs a loose standard to review excessive non-deadly force
claims. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395–96 (1988) (employing a reasona-
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Nor has it accounted for the possibility that these risks will
be positively correlated with minority status. Recent empirical
work by Roland Fryer using the Terry-stop-related records of
New York’s police found “large racial differences” in police use
of “non-lethal force,” including slapping, grabbing, and pushing
170
individuals into a wall or onto the ground. Even assuming
perfectly compliant behavior, African Americans were twenty171
one percent more likely to experience force than whites. In
Chicago, Wesley Skogan has found higher rates of nonlethal
force in the context of stops of blacks than in white citizen
172
stops.
Given such large racial differentials in the use of force, it
would hardly be surprising if a large proportion of the innocent
minority residents of high-crime neighborhood who are stopped
and frisked objected to aggressive SQF even if it had public
173
safety benefits that diffused to their benefit.
Third, the effects of Terry stops on the individuals subjected to police attention do not expire when their participants are
released from police control. Rather, negative experiences with
174
the police breed cynicism about the law, an unwillingness to
invoke the police’s aid, and a diminished proclivity to comply
with the law or cooperate with legal authorities. The connections between negative police treatment and strongly aversive
views of the police are empirically well grounded, albeit not in
bleness standard). The “indeterminacy” of the standard undermines the risk of
ex post liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens, both of which require a
“clear” legal rule to be violated. Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence
Justified?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119, 1140–41 (2008). Since Graham does not
supply a “clear” rule, there is rarely tort liability for excessive non-deadly
force. Id.
170. Roland G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in
Police Uses of Force 3 (July 2016) (unpublished draft), http://scholar
.harvard.edu/files/fryer/files/main-july_2016.pdf. For earlier work on increasing usage of disproportionate police force in minority neighborhoods, particularly when that minority was perceived as a demographic threat to a majority,
see Robert J. Kane, The Social Ecology of Police Misconduct, 40 CRIMINOLOGY
867, 887–88 (2002) (discussing the changing distribution of police force in New
York City between the 1970s and the 1990s).
171. Fryer, supra note 170, at 31.
172. Skogan, supra note 6, at 9.
173. See infra text accompanying notes 331–34 (addressing the argument
that SQF is justified because of minority community support).
174. On the concept of legal cynicism, see generally David S. Kirk & Andrew V. Papachristos, Cultural Mechanisms and the Persistance of Neighborhood Violence, 116 AM. J. SOC. 1190 (2011) (exploring the consequences of legal cyncisim).
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175

contexts where SQF has been implemented. But studies from
the specific cities where SFQ is employed demonstrate vividly
that intensive street policing has lingering effects on the dispositions and upon the beliefs of any population routinely subject
to its rigors.
For instance, a recent qualitative study of young men living in three high-crime neighborhoods in Philadelphia found
that less than ten percent were willing to call the police “in any
circumstance,” in part because many had themselves had nega176
tive experiences with the police in the past. Tellingly, the
same study also found resentment directed at police because of
177
their failure to respond to 911 calls in a timely fashion. Police, that is, are not seen reflexively in a negative light: it is
their intrusive and disrespectful behavior toward minority citizens in particular, coupled with their failure to provide noncoercive public safety, that elicits negative perceptions of the
badge.

175. Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl J. Wakslak, Profiling and Police Legitimacy:
Procedural Justice, Attributions of Motive, and Acceptance of Police Authority,
42 CRIMINOLOGY, 253, 276–78 (2004) (“To effectively deal with racial distrust
of the police in the minority community it is important to regulate not only the
selection of the people whom the police stop, but also the manner in which
they [sic] conduct stops as well.”). Sherry Colb has raised doubts that such
“targeting harm” is likely to arise because individuals stopped do not know the
police’s motivations and therefore cannot know if there is racial animus. Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1500 (1996). After Colb made this argument,
however, Epp and colleagues demonstrated empirically that minority motorists subject to vehicular stops based on minor regulatory offense are quite
aware of the fact that similarly situated white motorists would not have been
stopped, and make strong negative judgments of the police as a result. EPP ET
AL., supra note 111, at 117–18.
176. Patrick J. Carr et al., We Never Call the Cops and Here Is Why: A
Qualitative Examination of Legal Cynicism in Three Philadelphia Neighborhoods, 45 CRIMINOLOGY 445, 457 (2007). A parallel result was obtained in a
study in St. Louis. Rod K. Brunson, Police Don’t Like Black People: AfricanAmerican Young Men’s Accumulated Police Experiences, 6 CRIMINOLOGY &
PUB. POL’Y 71, 71–72 (2007) (detailing study that examined African-American
mens’ experiences and lack of trust of police).
177. Carr et al., supra note 176, at 459; accord Robert J. Sampson & Dawn
Jelgum Bartusch, Legal Cynicism and (Subcultural?) Tolerance of Deviance:
The Neighborhood Context of Racial Differences, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 777, 793
(1998) (finding “perceptions of injustice and alienation from police” in Chicago
neighborhoods of concentrated poverty, but rejecting the hypothesis that this
stems from a “black subculture of deviance”). Alice Goffman’s recent ethnography of impoverished Philadelphia confirms this. See also ALICE GOFFMAN, ON
THE RUN: FUGITIVE LIFE IN AN AMERICAN CITY (2014).

2434

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:2397

This study, however, focused on negative experiences of police, rather than the mere fact of being stopped. Although the
Philadelphia study suggests that young men in particular perceive police contact generally as negative, it does not test for
178
different effects of any police contact. In contrast, a recent
study in New York, examining young subjects specifically in
areas affected by SQF, found that increasing experience of
stops (whether negative or positive experiences) diminished
179
perceptions of police legitimacy. Another study in Chicago
has found not only that African Americans have “strikingly”
lower levels of trust in police, but “those caught up in enforcement and investigative stops were less trusting of police” by
180
almost forty-five percent. A larger body of empirical findings
from the United States and beyond demonstrates that diminished police legitimacy is associated with a diminished disposition to follow the law and a lesser willingness to cooperate with
181
police.
Relatedly, a high volume of stops concentrated in a specific
geographically locale can create a vicious-circle feedback loop
that flows from individual legal cynicism to increased collective
victimization, and then back again.
When police are perceived as endorsing excessive force
against racial minorities, members of that minority population
tend to become more reluctant to seek police aid. In a timeseries study of how highly publicized incidents of police violence
in Milwaukee influenced the use of 911, Matthew Desmond,
Andrew Papachristos and David Kirk found that such incidents

178. A recent study in St. Louis, Missouri, using a quantitative methodology, similarly found that “two-thirds of the young men [in the study] said the
police are almost never easy to talk to, nearly half said the police are almost
never polite.” Rod K. Brunson & Jody Miller, Young Black Men and Urban Policing in the United States, 46 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 613, 622 (2006). These
results suggest that it cannot be assumed that most stops are perceived as
positive or neutral.
179. Tom R. Tyler et al., Street Stops and Police Legitimacy: Teachable
Moments in Young Urban Men’s Legal Socialization, 11 J. EMP. L. STUD. 751,
772, figs. 3 & 4 (2014).
180. Skogan, supra note 6, at 13.
181. For a summary of research into police legitimacy, see Stephen J.
Schulhofer et al., American Policing at a Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies
and the Procedural Justice Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335,
338 (2011) (“[C]ompliance with the law and willingness to cooperate with enforcement efforts are primarily shaped not by the threat of force or the fear of
consequences, but rather by the strength of citizens’ beliefs that law enforcement agencies are legitimate.”).
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have a “clear and significant [negative] impact on citizen crime
182
reporting.” Other studies have found that when SQF is perceived as being distributed on racial grounds (perhaps because
African Americans and Hispanics are in fact at a much greater
183
per capita risk of being stopped than whites ), cynicism about
the law and police is likely to be sharpened within minority
communities. At the margin, violations of the law become more
184
frequent. As the expected risk of being victimized rises, therefore, residents of heavily policed areas become less willing to
proactively reach out to police. This further lowers the expected
cost of criminality, rather than alleviating it as SQF’s advo185
cates hoped. More crime in turn leads to more aggressive
SQF, which starts the cycle anew.
A version of one element of this dynamic has been termed
the “Ferguson effect.” This rather loaded term captures the
possibility that high-visibility instances of police misconduct
lead to increases in crime because of reduced confidence in police or because of increased risk-averseness on police’s part. Evidence for a broad Ferguson effect, however, is weak and is con186
fined to certain crimes in certain cities. If further evidence
were to emerge of such an effect, it would nevertheless
strengthen the vicious circle argument developed in the previous paragraphs.
Fourth is yet another vicious circle related to legal cynicism: if minorities have consistently negative views of the po182. Matthew Desmond et al., Police Violence and Citizen Crime Reporting
in the Black Community, 81 AM. SOC. REV. 857, 870 (2016).
183. See EPP ET AL., supra note 111, at 117 (“African-Americans and Latinos have developed and share with each other an extensive body of knowledge
about police behavior and police stops.”); accord VICTOR M. RIOS, PUNISHED,
POLICING THE LIVES OF BLACK AND LATINO BOYS 54–57 (2011) (detailing the
“code” Latinos and blacks in the inner city develop to survive violent communities).
184. See William J. Stuntz, Terry’s Impossibility, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
1213, 1217 (1998) (“If the police and, through them, the criminal justice system, come to be seen as illegitimate, the norms of law-abiding behavior could
unravel, with the streets becoming less safe, not more so.”).
185. See Robert J. Sampson, When Things Aren’t What They Seem: Context
and Cognition in Appearance-Based Regulation, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 97, 105
(2012) (“In communities with high levels of intersubjectively shared cynicism
of police misbehavior and the perceived irrelevance of legal rules, violence is
higher.”).
186. The best study of which I am aware is David C. Pyrooz et al., Was
There a Ferguson Effect on Crime Rates in Large U.S. Cities?, 46 J. CRIM.
JUST. 1, 7 (2016) which finds an effect only for homicide and robbery, and only
in cities with large impoverished minority communities.
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lice, and respond to stops accordingly, police may come to anticipate more resistance from those minorities. Shared police expectations of a greater risk of African-American violence in response to a police stop is one potential explanation for the
higher rates of force for black suspects that Fryer finds in the
187
New York SQF data. Consistent with this possibility, greater
perceived minority threat appears to predict higher levels of po188
lice use of force, controlling for other relevant predictors. Ap189
pearances, in this way, influence realities. The perception of
racial disproportionality in stops, on this theory, influences individual residents’ behavior, which in the aggregate creates racial differences in violence by police. This of course merely
190
strengthens minorities’ negative expectations of police. In
this way, large racial disparities in the physical harms associated with SQF can be reconciled with the “nearly uniform support for the principle of equal treatment” found in polling da191
ta.
Fifth, just as legal cynicism leads to higher victimization
rates, so too can the carceral consequences of SQF have negative effects. “[M]ore punitive police enforcement and parole
surveillance” leads to a higher frequency of repeat admissions
from a given neighborhood, which “begets more incarceration,”
192
which in turn begets more crime. To the extent SQF does not
result in arrests or incarceration, of course, this dynamic is
forestalled.
Sixth, SQF might solidify stereotypical assumptions about
the correlation of race and criminality. When neighborhoods
targeted for SQF are predominantly African American and
187. Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity To
Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1314, 1321–28 (2002) (finding subjects—instructed to act as officers—were quicker to use force against blacks than whites).
188. See Joscha Legewie & Jeffrey Fagan, Group Threat, Police Officer Diversity, and the Deadly Use of Police Force 2–4 (2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
189. This is an instance of what Adam Samaha calls “[a]ppearance driving
reality.” Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 1563, 1577 (2012).
190. The expert report in the New York litigation gestures at this dynamic
when it explains why propensity score matching is infeasible as a measure of
testing for discriminatory motives. Fagan Report, supra note 51, at 97–98.
191. Lincoln Quillian, New Approaches to Understanding Racial Prejudice
and Discrimination, 32 ANN. REV. SOC. 299, 309 (2006).
192. Jeffrey Fagan et al., Reciprocal Effects of Crime and Incarceration in
New York City Neighborhoods, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1551, 1554 (2003).
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Hispanic, SQF is likely to strengthen the widely shared percep193
tion of a connection between race and crime. Careful empirical studies have demonstrated that the racial composition of a
neighborhood already provides a cue for people’s estimates of
194
195
its disorderly character and its crime rate. SQF, especially
when explicitly justified on the basis of black criminality, works
as an official imprimatur upon this popular stereotype. And by
instantiating state policy on the basis of that spurious correlation, it deepens and ratifies racial stereotypes that predate any
known disparity in crime rates and invidious generalizations
that depend not on empirics, but rather on profound (and
196
harmful) assumptions about racial differences.
Consistent with this dynamic, empirical evidence already
suggests that suspects with darker skin pigmentation are more
197
198
likely to identified as criminal and punished more severely
than similarly situated lighter-toned suspects. It may also be
that the tighter perceived correlation between race and criminality reinforces residential segregation, by “mark[ing] off
199
‘black’ from ‘white’ neighborhoods.”
Seventh, another probable effect of SQF is a dampening of
civil participation by residents of affected neighborhoods in
193. See KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS:
RACE, CRIME, AND THE MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA (2010) (exploring
the ways in which at the beginning of the twentieth century, policymakers in
Northern cities began linking crime to African Americans on the basis of genetic and predispositional arguments).
194. Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder:
Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of “Broken Windows,” 67
SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 319, 319–20 (2004) (finding that perceptions of disorder in a
neighborhood were better predicted by the racial composition of a neighborhood than by actual disorder).
195. Lincoln Quillian & Devah Pager, Black Neighbors, Higher Crime? The
Role of Racial Stereotypes, 107 AM. J. SOC. 717, 718 (2001) (“[T]he percentage
of a neighborhood’s black population, particularly the percentage [of ] young
black men, is significantly associated with perceptions of the severity of a
neighborhood’s crime problem.”).
196. Annabelle Lever makes the related and important point that racebased policing often “reflects racist attitudes, institutions and habits while obscuring its contribution to them.” Annabelle Lever, Why Racial Profiling Is
Hard To Justify: A Response to Risse and Zeckhauser, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
94, 97 (2005) (emphases omitted).
197. Travis L. Dixon & Keith B. Maddox, Skin Tone, Crime News, and Social Reality Judgments: Priming the Stereotype of the Dark and Dangerous
Black Criminal, 35 J. APP. SOC. PSYCH. 1555, 1555–56 (2005).
198. Jennifer L. Hochschild & Vesla Weaver, The Skin Color Paradox and
the American Racial Order, 86 SOC. FORCES 643, 644 (2007).
199. ANDERSON, supra note 142, at 42.
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ways that, over time, conduce to diminished collective political
power. Important recent work by Amy Lerman and Vesla
Weaver has demonstrated empirically that contact with the
criminal justice system, including nonconsensual stops, has a
substantial and statistically significant effect on trust in gov200
ernment. In one national sample, “[t]he probability of voting
201
declined by 8 percent for those who have been stopped.” Once
again, there is a potent vicious circle in operation here: SQF is
a form of policing that allocates most of its costs to minorities
living in concentrated poverty. But the downstream effect of a
high stop rate is that roughly one in ten of those subjected to
SQF become less likely to vote. Like felon disenfranchisement
laws, SQF thus has the effect of sapping low-income minority
communities’ influence on public policy and on the political dis202
tribution of valued public goods, even as it purports to empower those communities.
Eighth, and finally, is yet another potential aggregate-level
effect—this time upon the level of “collective efficacy” within a
neighborhood. Developed by the Harvard sociologist Robert
Sampson, the concept of collective efficacy involves “the linkage
203
of mutual trust and the shared willingness to intervene.” In
repeated studies, high levels of collective efficacy have been
found to boost “neighborhoods[’ ability] to realize the common
values of residents and maintain effective social controls is a
major source of neighborhood variation in violence” and in par204
ticular homicide. Although there is no study of the effect of
200. LERMAN & WEAVER, supra note 81, at 150–51 (presenting a range of
tests reflecting Americans’ levels of trust in government).
201. Id. at 222–23. In a separate article, Lerman and Weaver find parallel
results in a New York sample. Amy E. Lerman & Vesla M. Weaver, Staying
out of Sight? Concentrated Policing and Local Political Action, 651 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 202, 204 (2014) (finding in a study of New York
that “witnessing stops that occur with little justification and that feature
physical force can make people feel occupied and powerless, and can incentivize disengagement with government”).
202. Todd R. Clear, The Effect of High Imprisonment Rates on Communities, 37 CRIME & JUST. 97, 116 (2008).
203. Robert J. Sampson, Neighborhood Effects, Causal Mechanisms, and
the Social Structure of the City, in ANALYTIC SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL MECHANISMS 227, 232 (P. Demeulenaere ed., 2011).
204. Jeffrey D. Morenoff et al., Neighborhood Inequality, Collective Efficacy, and the Spatial Dynamics of Urban Violence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 517, 551
(2001) (finding that measures of lower collective efficacy in a neighborhood independently predict increased homicide risk); Robert J. Sampson et al., Assessing ‘Neighborhood Effects’: Social Processes and New Directions in Research, 28 ANN. REV. SOC. 443, 457 (2002) (same); Sampson et al., supra note
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SQF on levels of collective efficacy, there is little reason to
think it will be positive. If contact with the police breeds legal
cynicism, intracommunal violence, anxiety, and an unwillingness to engage politically, it is hard to see how it could foster
collective efficacy. If that is so, SQF suppresses a key determinant of public safety within neighborhoods.
In considering these eight pathways, it is important to note
that in many respects, their effects are likely endure across
generations. Most impoverished African-American youth, as
well as a “significant” proportion of middle-income ones, live in
urban neighborhoods of concentrated poverty of the kind sub205
ject to SQF. SQF is likely pivotal in the formation of many
minority children’s understandings of their status and possibilities in America, an effect compounded by the further fact that
one in four black children already experiences parental incar206
ceration. To think that SQF’s structural harms will be transient, therefore, is to be far too optimistic.
This is a long list. Its items, though, should not be viewed
in isolation. Rather, these mechanisms operate in simultaneous
and overlapping ways. All of these pathways generate costs
concentrated on the minority individuals and communities in
which SQF is imposed. In this, their effects are intersecting
and cumulative. Impoverished minority individuals, and
through them their communities, become more demoralized, alienated, anxious, crime-ridden, and politically powerless. The
net effect of SQF’s eight costs, therefore, is singular: it is to
maintain and even deepen social and geographic schisms that
separate neighborhoods and racial groups.
It is for this reason that SQF cannot be understood as
merely an individual-level intervention. It sets in motion a
range of important social processes, largely detrimental to the
shared interests of a neighborhood and a racial group, in ways
that reiterate and recapitulate extant racial and social hierarchies.

99, at 918.
205. Orlando Patterson, The Social and Cultural Matrix of Black Youth, in
THE CULTURAL MATRIX: UNDERSTANDING BLACK YOUTH 45, 47 (O. Patterson
& Ethan Fosse eds., 2015).
206. SARA WAKEFIELD & CHRISTOPHER WILDEMAN, CHILDREN OF THE
PRISON BOOM: MASS INCARCERATION AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN INEQUALITY 41 (2014) (“For black children . . . the risk of having a father imprisoned before their fourteenth birthday was one in four.”).
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These dynamics, finally, may help explain the surprising
207
lack of empirical evidence of crime reduction from SQF. At an
aggregate level, communities subject to SQF are likely to see
their political efficacy, their collective efficacy, and their shared
commitment to the law wither. One effect of these changes is
an expected increase in levels of crime. This may offset whatever gains the direct application of SQF achieves partially or in
full. SQF, in short, is a short-term panacea that in the mediumterm may well prove self-defeating.
D. THE DISTINCTIVE MORAL WRONG OF SQF
This Part has so far provided a definition and analysis of
the positives and negatives of SQF with the aim of refashioning
the case against SQF. Rather than cabining the inquiry by imposing artificial constitutional categories at the threshold, I
have identified both individual and neighborhood-level costs
and benefits. With a clear picture of both positives and negatives in hand, it is possible to recapitulate the argument
against SQF in a more nuanced form. To be sure, absent precise quantification of both costs and benefits, that argument
necessarily has a provisional aspect. I have no proof that the
policy’s costs exceed its benefits. Nevertheless, I view the
weakness of benefit-related evidence and the accumulation of
cost-related evidence as sufficiently clear to suggest that a
working account of the distinctive moral wrong of SQF is feasible.
The core of the case against SQF is dynamic and ecological
in character. It rests on the policy’s effect not just on the specific persons stopped by police on the street, but on the dynamic
role that SQF plays in the social and racial stratifications that
concatenate with each other to create urban residential segregation. It is an analysis, moreover, that proceeds without making any assumption of racial animus or individual officer fault.
In the early 1990s, SQF was adopted as a response to rising violent crime associated with minority-dominated neighborhoods characterized by concentrated poverty. In that respect, it was at its origin a response to an unexpected
externality from the urban residential segregation that had
been promoted by state actors from World War II onward.

207. See supra Part I.B.2.
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Local and state officials might have taken another path.
From the 1960s onwards, historian Elizabeth Hinton has
demonstrated, national and local politics gradually “blended
opportunity, development, and training programs of the War on
Poverty with the surveillance, patrol, and detention programs
209
of the War on Crime.” By the 1980s, however, the War on
Crime “would eventually completely supplant” Great Society
210
antipoverty programs as a solution to urban discontent. Noncoercive solutions, in short, had already been tabled by the time
the crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s was in full
211
flush.
Nevertheless, the policy response to that crime-wave has
had ironically limited crime-control-related payoff, while at the
same time ratifying racial stereotypes, emasculating minority
communities politically, and exacerbating their social and political weaknesses. Especially given the backdrop of municipal
policies that consciously enabled and entrenched the urban
ghetto, this policy choice was a morally problematic one. It was,
in effect, a choice by the state to exacerbate a form of racial
stratification for which the state itself bears large moral (if not
constitutional) responsibility.
212
SQF is thus but one link in a larger “process” of social
and racial stratification in ways that extend well beyond the
discrete effects of an isolated encounter between one officer and
213
one resident. Given its exiguous benefits (shared across the
208. Accord RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 161 (1997)
(arguing that greater expenditures on police is always an alternative to racial
profiling).
209. Elizabeth Hinton, ‘A War Within Our Boundaries’: Lyndon Johnson’s
Great Society and the Rise of the Carceral State, 102 J. AM. HIST. 100, 101
(2015).
210. Id. at 111. Indeed, the larger a city’s black population, the more it
spent on policing through the 1970s. Pamela Irving Jackson & Leo Carroll,
Race and the War on Crime: The Sociopolitical Determinants of Municipal Police Expenditures in 90 Non-Southern U.S. Cities, 46 AM. SOC. J. 290, 302–03
(1981) (finding that a city’s black population was a “significant predictor of expenditures for police salaries and operations”).
211. Cf. DUNEIER, supra note 162 (noting that African-American “ghettos,”
as he calls them, are still characterized by a policy of “withholding resources
and opportunities for poor blacks”).
212. Pager & Shepherd, supra note 160, at 182 (“Beyond more conventional
forms of individual racism, institutional processes . . . are important to consider.”).
213. Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color
Blindness” Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL.
L. REV. 77, 82 (2000) (“[S]ocial stratification is constituted through features of
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whole of society) and its multifarious costs (largely concentrated within already-impoverished minority communities), it is
hard to imagine that SQF would have anything but regressive
214
distributive effects as between racial groups.
On the assumption that my judgments about the relative
magnitude of costs and benefits are sustained, therefore, I believe that SQF can fairly be characterized as “a systemic and
institutional phenomenon that reproduces racial inequality and
215
the presumption of black and brown criminality.” It is one of
the mechanisms by which racial division in American society is
produced and reproduced.
Given this characterization, I resist claims that the problem of race in policing is a distraction, and that it would be better to focus reforming energies on (say) the problem of mass in216
217
carceration or structural inequality. SQF—even absent any
racial animus—cannot be separated from larger processes of
subordination along social and racial lines, and efforts to distinguish the two phenomena are deeply misguided.
Equally beside the point are claims that SQF is based on
an accurate generalization about racial minorities’ criminali218
ty. Such background regularities are themselves functions of
state action given the state’s role in perpetuating racialized
concentrated poverty, which is in turn correlated with crime. A
policy choice that reinforces rather than dissipates the force of
(1) social structure (institutions or practices) and (2) social meaning (stories or
reasons).”).
214. See ZIMRING, supra note 118, at 149 (“[A]ggressiveness in policing is a
costly strategy because it imposes real disadvantages on exactly the minority
poor who can least afford additional handicaps.”).
215. Naomi Murakawa & Katherine Beckett, The Penology of Racial Innocence: The Erasure of Racism in the Study and Practice of Punishment, 44 L. &
SOC. REV. 695, 701 (2010).
216. See R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug
War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571, 594–98 (2003) (“[T]he social harms of incarceration
. . . are likely to be underappreciated in the racial profiling debate.”).
217. In a much-noted analysis, Mathias Risse and Richard Zeckhauser posit a form of profiling that has large crime-control gains, and then argue that
“much of the harm ostensibly done by profiling” should be ascribed to “systematic racism rather than the acts of profiling.” Mathias Risse & Richard
Zeckhauser, Racial Profiling, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 131, 145 (2004). My argument here is aimed at showing this claim of separation, however plausible in
their hypothesized framework, does not hold in the world, and that the benefits of eliminating SQF would not (as they put it) be “comparatively modest.”
Id. at 149. Similarly, it is not the case that “African American communities . . .
incur short-term costs while benefiting in the long run” from SQF. Id. at 163.
218. See sources cited supra note 83.
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that pernicious generalization is hardly entitled to deference
219
based on its putative accuracy.
A legal remedy might not be able to capture all of the diverse causal pathways I have identified here. But a legal remedy should nonetheless respond in part to SQF’s distinctive
moral wrong by identifying those instances of policing choice
that have the least positive effect on security with the largest
stratification-related spillovers. It is this question of the aptitude of constitutional doctrine and its subconstitutional counterpart in disparate-impact law to which I now turn.
II. STREET POLICING AND THE LIMITS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE
This Part turns to the core doctrines of constitutional law
invoked and applied in challenges to SQF—the Fourth
Amendment doctrine associated with Terry and the Equal Protection Clause rules that have coalesced around Feeney. I argue
that there is a mismatch between these doctrinal vehicles and
the core normative challenge posed by SQF as I have articulated it in Part I. This mismatch renders current constitutional
law ill-suited to accounting for the normative challenges of
SQF.
Thinking about the costs and benefits of SQF in terms of
Fourth Amendment and Equal Protection law instead reveals a
troublingly asymmetrical gap cutting across both doctrinal
structures. To wit, Fourth Amendment law and Equal Protection law alike employ narrow transactional frames to tally the
costs imposed by state action to traditionally subordinate minorities, but are periodically open to dynamic and ecological effects in ways that serve to obscure or exculpate harms to racial
minorities.
To see the mismatch between current constitutional doctrine and SQF programs in a nutshell, consider a simple hypothetical. Imagine a police force in which every officer had internalized both Terry and Feeney. Each officer, in consequence,
understood that she could not make a nonconsensual street
stop without the relevant reasonable articulable suspicion of
criminality, and that she could not make that stop “‘because of,’

219. Even our impoverished Equal Protection doctrine, see infra Part II,
does not overtly treat accuracy as a sufficient justification for the use of racial
classifications. David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. CT.
REV. 99, 119.
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220

not merely ‘in spite of’” the perceived racial identity of the individual to be stopped. What would change in the actual practice of SQF? Would the concerns about the volume and racial
disparities in stops be assuaged?
The short answer is probably not. Consistent with the
weak Terry rule, it may well be possible for a police force to
conduct a very large volume of stops. Consistent with Feeney,
those stops might be constitutionally valid even if they were
distributed in a way that deepens racial stratification. Indeed,
racial disparities are particularly likely to persist if police sincerely believe that African Americans commit a disproportionate share of offenses and thus ought to comprise a higher percapita rate of street stops. The application of conventional constitutional doctrine under the Fourth Amendment and the
Equal Protection Clause, therefore, is consistent with preservation of SQF at its present volume and as characterized by current racial disparities.
This Part first considers the Fourth Amendment law, and
shows its inadequacies. It then analyzes Equal Protection doctrine to reveal why it has utterly failed to address the problem
of street policing.
A. THE LIMITS OF FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
The Fourth Amendment law of street stops cannot impose
a meaningful constraint upon SQF in minority neighborhoods
characterized by concentrated poverty. To the contrary, Fourth
Amendment doctrine systematically lowers the cost of such
stops in comparison to others conducted outside the distinctive
urban ecologies of SQF. To the extent that the Fourth Amendment law of street policing takes account of changing social and
institutional contexts, though, it is thoroughly asymmetrically.
It accounts for such contexts only when doing so expands state
authority.
The “reasonable articulable suspicion” predicates for a Terry stop and a related frisk are not demanding hurdles. They focus solely on the ex-ante evidentiary basis for a stop, and wholly ignore the manner in which a stop is conducted. Terry, that
is, takes no account of variance in the potential dignitary and
demoralization externalities imposed by aggressive or demeaning police behavior. Moreover, the Court has not defined “reasonable articulable suspicion” beyond warning that an officer
220. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
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must be able to articulate something more than a “hunch[].”
The Court has instead underscored that this evaluation be
222
made under the “totality of the circumstances.” This gives officers a wide array of predicate facts to choose from when making their case. With one exception, officers’ subjective beliefs
and knowledge are as a result available as bases for a Terry
223
stop, even though such subjective factors are not relevant to
224
the Fourth Amendment analysis in other contexts. The exception is also telling: even where race is the real (i.e., subjective)
basis of the stop, the Fourth Amendment provides no remedy
where alternative factual grounds for reasonable articulable
225
suspicion can be conjured.
Quite apart from this peculiar gerrymandering of the legally relevant grounds for evaluating the quality of a stop, officers’
discretion is rarely in practice subject to rigorous adversarial
testing in a subsequent criminal adjudication. Where the sole
witnesses to a stop are the suspect and arresting officers, there
is little reason to think the resulting testimonial contest will
result in accurate outcomes. Police have a strong incentive to
226
color the facts in their favor, or even outright lie. A recent
ethnographic account of the Chicago criminal courts, for example, paints a bleak picture of judges who routinely “laughed at
the fabrication of police reports as if it were a novelty, rather
227
than an abuse of power.”

221. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968); see also United States v.
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (noting that reasonable articulable suspicion
is considerably lower than the preponderance of evidence standard).
222. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990).
223. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 563 (1980) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (“Among the circumstances that can give rise to reasonable suspicion are the agent’s knowledge of the methods used in recent criminal activity
and the characteristics of persons engaged in such illegal practices.”).
224. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 464 (2011) (“Our cases have repeatedly rejected a subjective approach, asking only whether the circumstances,
viewed objectively, justify the action.” (quoting Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart,
547 U.S. 398 (2006)).
225. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“We think these
cases foreclose any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic
stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.”).
226. See Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What To Do
About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1040 (1996).
227. Nicole Gonzalez Van Cleave, Chicago’s Racist Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 15, 2016, at A27; see also NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEAVE, CROOK COUNTY: RACISM AND INJUSTICE IN AMERICA’S LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT 146–53
(2016) (discussing perjury and abuse by police).
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Chicago’s pathologies might be extreme, but it is hard to
imagine such practices are wholly absent from other large met228
ropolitan court systems. In many urban jurisdictions, therefore, there will be little effectual incentive for officers to comply
with Terry’s meager epistemic exhortation.
Nevertheless, the general trend in judicial reworkings of
Terry has been deflationary. I will just give one example, as it
happens one that is particularly relevant to SQF. Whereas the
Terry Court allowed the stop and frisk only when an officer
229
suspected crime was “afoot,” subsequent cases extended that
230
power to instances in which a crime has been completed.
While at first blush it might seem innocuous and sensible,
this subtle shift in practice dramatically expands police discretion. Under Terry, the constellation of facts that might be invoked to justify a stop was bounded by what an officer could ob231
serve at a specific moment in time. Now, an officer can rely
on a far greater universe of historical facts, available through a
police forces’ index of suspect descriptions, to support reasonable articulable suspicion.
In a handful of controversial cases, descriptions identifying
African-American suspects have been employed to conduct
232
blanket searches. In the controversial case of Brown v. City of
Oneonta, for example, a description of a black male suspect
provoked Oneonta police to stop more than two hundred “non228. See, e.g., William Glaberson, In Tiny Courts of New York, Abuses of
Law and Power, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2006, at A1 (documenting racial and
sexual bigotry in New York State courts).
229. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); see also United States v. Cortez,
449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981) (“Based upon that whole picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.”). In some instances, the Court has
used language that suggests a resistance to settling on a specific quantum of
suspicion. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (“While ‘reasonable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the
Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification
for making the stop.”).
230. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985).
231. Terry, 392 U.S. at 33.
232. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562–63
(1976) (determining that secondary of inspection of motorists do not violate the
Constitution even if referrals are made largely on the basis of Mexican ancestry); Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 339 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Yet our role
is not to evaluate whether the police action in question was the appropriate
response under the circumstances, but to determine whether what was done
violated the Equal Protection Clause.”).
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white persons,” including women, encountered on the streets.
Even absent the broad search at issue in Brown, a large enough
pool of suspect descriptions (as is likely to be the case in large
cities) means that police discretion to stop becomes orders of
234
magnitude larger than the authority defined in Terry.
Subsequent refinements to the Terry regime have rendered
SQF more attractive relative to other ways of deploying policing resources. As the late William Stuntz noted, criminal procedure rules can act as “subsidies . . . making some kinds of . . .
235
law enforcement . . . cheaper” than others. Stuntz applied
this logic to make a comparison between “policing street markets,” which is “cheap,” for the police, and the more expensive
236
regulation of indoor, upscale drug markets. His point, though,
can be extended to the neighborhood level.
For a parallel differential arises between neighborhoods of
concentrated poverty and areas of comparative wealth because
of two Fourth Amendment precedents. First, the Court in Illinois v. Wardlow held that a suspect’s mere presence in a “high
crime area,” and more particularly “an area of heavy narcotics
237
trafficking” was “relevant” to the legality of a Terry stop. Evidence from New York’s SQF practice also demonstrates that
this term is “vulnerable to subjective and highly contextualized
238
interpretation.”
This may be of particular concern to the extent that an increasing proportion of minorities tends to create a belief of dis-

233. 235 F.3d 769, 779 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., dissenting from denial
of rehearing en banc); see also Bela August Walker, The Color of Crime: The
Case Against Race-Based Suspect Descriptions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 662, 673–
74 (2003) (describing other cases of blanket searches for black suspects, and
noting the absence of even anecdotal evidence of the same happening for white
suspects).
234. Further discretion arises when police use predictive algorithms, such
as PredPol, to forecast crime patterns. See Erica Goode, Sending the Police Before There’s a Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/08/16/us/16police.html.
235. William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119
HARV. L. REV. 781, 782 (2006).
236. William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795,
1821 (1998).
237. 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000).
238. Fagan & Geller, supra note 11, at 79; see also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High Crime Area” Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion
Analysis, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1609 (2008) (“[W]hat is termed a ‘high-crime
area’ can differ from case to case, and jurisdiction to jurisdiction.”).
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orderliness and criminality, as multiple studies show,
Wardlow creates an incentive to target minority neighborhoods.
Indeed, even setting aside the question of how a “high crime
area” is to be identified or bounded, Wardlow explicitly subsidizes police activity in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty
240
in comparison to wealthy neighborhoods.
Second, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Utah v.
241
creates an incentive for officers to target for stops
Streiff
populations that are likely to have a higher per capita rate of
bench warrants. In Streiff, the arresting officer was conducting
a stakeout of a house where drug sales were suspected to hap242
pen. He saw Strieff leave the house and stopped him, despite
lacking the Terry predicate of reasonable articulable suspi243
cion. As a result of what the state conceded to be an illegal
244
stop, the officer asked Streiff for identification. Upon checking the produced documentation with his dispatcher, the officer
learned of an outstanding warrant for Streiff and arrested
245
him. A search incident to arrest found methamphetamine and
246
drug paraphernalia.
The issue before the Court was whether this evidence
247
should be excluded as fruit of the initial illegal stop. Writing
248
for five Justices, Justice Thomas said no. Characterizing the
initial unlawful stop as “negligent” and a “good-faith” mis249
take, the Court found the search-incident-to-arrest that had
produced the narcotics to be “sufficiently attenuated by the pre250
existing arrest warrant.” Hence, the evidence found during
the search incident to arrest was not subject to exclusion in
251
Streiff’s criminal adjudication.
As Justice Sotomayor’s dissent pointed out, “Outstanding
252
warrants are surprisingly common.” A recent ethnography of
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

See supra text accompanying notes 194–95.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124.
136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016).
Id. at 2059.
Id. at 2060.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2064.
Id. at 2063.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2068 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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misdemeanor courts in New York illustrates how courts and
prosecutors generate a large volume of outstanding warrants
for failures to appear at repeatedly rescheduled hearings, and
then seek dispositions with little effect other than to facilitate
253
later arrests.
In Streiff, Justice Sotomayor did not contextualize the use
of outstanding warrants in the SQF context. But she cited evidence gathered by the Justice Department in Ferguson, Missouri, and explained that the “astounding numbers of warrants
can be used by police to stop people without cause,” and flagged
that “it is no secret that people of color are disproportionate vic254
tims of this type of scrutiny.” Justice Sotomayor’s analysis is
hard to dispute. Police, indeed, have long been cognizant of the
strategic potential for outstanding-warrant checks during
255
street stops and have strategically exploited it.
The decision in Streiff creates a new incentive for police to
256
engage in “negligent” stops, lacking even with the minimal
accouterments of reasonable articulable suspicion, in order to
check for warrants. This incentive becomes more powerful as
the expected number of such outstanding warrants in a neigh257
borhood increases. Here then is yet another incentive pressing police to focus street patrols on neighborhoods of concentrated poverty: even if they cannot muster the minimal
evidentiary predicate of Terry, officers have a sure-fire way of
showing “progress,” simply by making illegal stops and arresting based on either outstanding warrants or contraband found
during a search incident to arrest. Streiff allows officers to em253. Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors,
66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 659 (2014).
254. Streiff, 136 S. Ct. at 2068 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
255. The link between Terry stops and outstanding warrants is not a new
one. In the late 1990s, New York police realized that quality-of-life stops could
be leveraged into frequent arrests that removed many from the streets. See
Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and OrderMaintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 341 n.210 (1998)
(describing Mayor Rudy Giuliani’s endorsement of this tactic in 1998).
256. Equally, Strieff is an incentive for police departments to fail to train
adequately their officers on the factual predicates of a Terry stop. See generally Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063 (“Officer Fackrell was at most negligent.”).
257. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Says Police May Use Evidence
Found After Illegal Stops, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes
.com/2016/06/21/us/supreme-court-says-police-may-use-evidence-found-after
-illegal-stops.html (noting reports cited in the dissent of Justice Sotomayor
that claimed that there are outstanding warrants out on 16,000 of 21,000 residents in Ferguson, Missouri).
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ploy stops even absent Terry suspicion and demonstrate “success.”
Decisions such as Wardlow and Streiff mean that current
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence systematically tilts in favor
of SQF. The doctrinal framework at work in these cases minimizes both proximate and distant harms to individuals
stopped. It also ignores the ecological harms and dynamic strat258
ification effects associated with SQF. Indeed, it seems fair to
say that the vocabulary of the Fourth Amendment does not at
present contain the resources even to account for those harms,
let alone hold them in the balance with Terry stops’ positive,
crime-control effects.
One indication of this is that Justice Sotomayor’s comments about the ecological context of street policing were so
strikingly at odds with the normative verbiage of the Court’s
Fourth Amendment cases that they generated national media
259
attention. If the mere fact a Justice is cognizant of the larger
policy context in which a legal question arises stimulates the
press into action, it is because the modal Fourth Amendment
decision is hermetically detached from the distinctive ecological
and dynamic costs flowing from urban policing.
Nevertheless, that jurisprudence is not wholly bounded by
a narrow, transactional focus. Rather, the Court selectively and
asymmetrically accounts for dynamic effects. Consider the
260
Streiff Court’s treatment of the exclusionary remedy. The
Court’s foundational decisions about the scope of that remedy
261
focus on its effects on officers’ incentives. The Court has repeatedly stressed that it is willing to allow the costly exclusionary remedy only when its downstream incentive effects in relation to police compliance with the Fourth Amendment are
262
substantial. Notionally acknowledging this point, the Streiff

258. See Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV.
761, 779 (2012) (“[A]nyone who has experienced a Terry stop, however, knows
that the harm to dignity can be substantial. And anyone who has been frisked
knows that the invasion affects bodily integrity far more than privacy.”).
259. See Adam Liptak, In Dissents, Sonia Sotomayor Takes on the Criminal
Justice System, N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/
05/us/politics/in-dissents-sonia-sotomayor-takes-on-the-criminal-justice
-system.html.
260. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2061.
261. Id. at 2073–74 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
262. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 917 (1984) (“Judges and
magistrates are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team; as neutral judicial
officers, they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions.

2017]

POLICING DISPARATE POLICING

2451

Court stated that only “purposeful or flagrant” police miscon263
duct needed to be deterred by exclusion.
But why this would be so is not clear. Tort liability for negligence, for example, can easily be premised on a deterrence
264
theory. In Streiff itself, the Court gave no thought to the possibility that its rule might elicit less care by officers in their use
of Terry stops—let alone a differential impact in neighborhoods
characterized by high rates of outstanding or bench warrants.
Streiff suggests that the Court is willing to think about the
dynamic effects of the exclusionary rule on incentives when doing so narrows Fourth Amendment remedies, but it is not willing to entertain a dynamic analysis when doing so would ex265
In other cases, the Justices have
pand those remedies.
similarly been willing to account for increases in police profes266
sionalism. Yet judicial decisions on the exclusionary rule systematically ignore potential institutional problems of police
267
perjury and abusive conduct.
There is, in short, little reason to expect that the Court’s
current Fourth Amendment doctrine will provide a vehicle for
capturing the distinctive wrong of SQF. Indeed to the extent it
nudges police conduct of urban street policing in one way or another, the Court has abetted the core wrong of SQF more than
it has ameliorated it. For this reason, it seems wise to also analyze SQF in terms of its racial impact—a topic addressed at
length below and in Part III.

The threat of exclusion thus cannot be expected significantly to deter them.”);
see also Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 548–49 (2012) (reiterating
Leon’s deterrence-based logic); Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236–37
(2011) (same).
263. 136 S. Ct. at 2063.
264. Id. at 2072–73 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
265. In a similar vein, David Sklansky has pointed out that the Court toggles without any principled basis between rules and standards in Fourth
Amendment case-law in ways that inure to the government’s benefit. See David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the
Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 294–98.
266. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598 (2006) (“Another development over the past half-century that deters civil-rights violations is the increasing professionalism of police forces, including a new emphasis on internal
police discipline.”).
267. For a discussion of how these problems arise, and why common state
and local rules exacerbate them, see Aziz Z. Huq & Richard McAdams, Litigating the Blue Wall of Silence: How To Challenge the Police Privilege To Delay
Investigation, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 213, 213–26.
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B. THE LIMITS OF EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court’s decisions on race and the Equal Protection Clause provide no better traction on the distinctive
wrong of SQF. To the contrary, thinking about racial equality
doctrine through the lens of SQF illuminates a gap between the
Court’s articulated justifications and its current doctrinal specifications. To take seriously the normative concerns I have
flagged would mean treating SQF as a paradigmatic Equal Protection violation. Today, however, the doctrine relegates policing disparities to the margin.
Two core prohibitions are embodied in current Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence. First, explicit racial classifications trigger strict scrutiny, and require government to
“demonstrate with clarity” that its “purpose or interest is both
constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of
the classification is necessary . . . to the accomplishment of its
268
purpose.”
269
In the absence of an explicit racial classification, a government action motivated by a “discriminatory purpose” with
an adverse effect on a discrete protected class establishes an
Equal Protection Clause violation. But the Court’s gloss on discriminatory purpose, promulgated in Personnel Administrator
270
of Massachusetts v. Feeney, is cast in exacting terms. It compels litigants to show that a state actor “selected or reaffirmed
a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not
merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable
271
group.” In contrast, a disparate impact on a racial group
alone does nothing to impugn the constitutionality of a state ac272
tion.

268. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016) (quoting
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418 (2013)).
269. This is a bit imprecise. “Often, courts do not approach the question
whether a statute uses express racial classifications on formal grounds at all.
Instead, the grounds of decision are normative.” See Primus, supra note 41, at
509.
270. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
271. 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (citation omitted). The same standard applies
to both religious and racial discrimination. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
677 (2009).
272. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 264–65 (1977) (“[O]fficial action will not be held unconstitutional solely
because it results in a racially disproportionate impact.” (citing Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976))).
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In the criminal justice context, this doctrinal framework
leaves the state with a largely free hand. At the Supreme
Court, few Equal Protection cases have arisen in the criminal
justice context concerning systemic or structural inequalities,
as opposed to discrete instances of bias on the part of individual
actors such as jurors or (more rarely) prosecutors.
Only one recent case has grappled with an explicit racial
classification. In Johnson v. California, a state prison used a
racial classification to sort inmates temporarily before cell as273
signments could be determined. The Court rejected the state’s
274
call to derogate from strict scrutiny. In contrast, the Court
declined to grant certiorari in Brown v. City of Oneonta, a case
that would have required it to consider whether the Second
Circuit had correctly held that a race-based suspect description
275
was not a “racial classification” subject to strict scrutiny.
Under Feeney, there are a handful of cases in which prosecutorial use of preemptory challenges is held to be racially mo276
tivated, and thus to violate the Equal Protection Clause. But
more systemic challenges to the operation of the criminal justice institutions have been wholly absent from the Court’s
277
docket since the 1987 case of McClesky v. Kemp. In large
measure, this is because McCleskey established a near278
insurmountable barrier to such challenges. In that capital
273. 543 U.S. 499, 502–03 (2005) (describing prison policy).
274. Id. at 505 (“[A]ll racial classifications [imposed by government] . . .
must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.” (citation omitted)).
275. 221 F.3d 329, 337 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 235 F.3d 769 (2000).
276. Such cases are rare, but not unknown. In the 2015 Supreme Court
Term, for example, the Court found that the Georgia Supreme Court had
made a “clearly erroneous” decision when it declined to find that prosecution
use of preemptory strikes in a capital case was not animated by a discriminatory purpose. Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1747–55 (2016). This is an
extremely rare ruling, and is explained by the graphic evidence of naked racial
reasoning (inadvertently) discovered by the defendant. Id. at 1744. This is not
the only instance, though, in which a finding of discriminatory purpose in the
use of preemptory challenges has led to a conviction being vacated. See, e.g.,
Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008).
277. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
278. McCleskey was quickly pilloried, and has been much criticized since.
See, e.g., Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment,
and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1389 (1988) (“Professor
Bedau does not exaggerate when he compares McCleskey to Plessy and
Korematsu.”). Even Justice Powell, who provided a fifth vote in the case, expressed regret for that vote. David Von Drehle, Retired Justice Changes Stand
on Death Penalty, WASH. POST, June 10, 1994, at A1. It is not without interest
that another case in which Justice Powell cast the deciding vote, and later ex-
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case, the Court declined to infer discriminatory purpose from
unrebutted statistical evidence that Georgia’s capital punishment treated defendants differently based on their race and the
279
race of their victim. Among the reasons the Court offered for
280
declining to entertain even powerful statistical evidence, it
worried that “if we accepted McCleskey’s claim that racial bias
has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision, we
could soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of
281
penalty,” including noncapital sentencing. This concern about
what Justice Brennan acerbically characterized as “a fear of too
282
much justice” reoccurs in other instances in which criminal
283
justice disparities have been challenged.
Absent the miraculous happenstance of testimonial or documentary evidence of bias—a stroke of luck that befell plain284
tiffs in the challenge to New York’s SQF policy —McCleskey
pressed regret, has since been overruled. Anand Agneshwar, Ex-Justice Says
He May Have Been Wrong, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 5, 1990, at 3 (noting Powell’s regret at having cast a deciding vote in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986), which was overruled in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
279. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286–87. The race-of-the-defendant effect identified in the Baldus study, however, was relatively small in comparison to
race-of-the-victim effects. Id.
280. Although McCleskey has been much criticized, it is still worth reiterating here that many of its reasons for rejecting statistical evidence are plainly
spurious. For example, the Court asserted that an unlawful purpose might
more safely be inferred if there were “fewer entities” and “fewer variables.” Id.
at 294–95. But the confidence generated by regression increases with size—it
does not decrease. And the more alternative explanations for variance exist,
the more plausible defenses the state has. Further, the Court stated that “discretion is essential to the criminal justice process; we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion has been abused.”
Id. at 297. This is hard to understand; in the absence of discretion, there
would be no opportunity for a state actor to take a decision motivated by a discriminatory purpose. To insulate discretionary decisions from review for such
invalid purposes is to say in effect that there is no discriminatory-purpose liability in the criminal law.
281. Id. at 315, n.38.
282. Id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Court next states that its
unwillingness to regard petitioner’s evidence as sufficient is based in part on
the fear that recognition of McCleskey’s claim would open the door to widespread challenges to all aspects of criminal sentencing . . . [S]uch a statement
seems to suggest a fear of too much justice.”).
283. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 376 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting “the potentially radical implications” of inferences from statistical evidence of racial disparities in the criminal-justice context).
284. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 603 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (quoting the highest ranking uniformed officer of the New York Police
Department as mandating stops of young black and Hispanic youth between
the ages of fourteen and twenty).
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means that the courthouse door is effectively shut to discrimi285
natory-purpose challenges in the criminal justice context.
McCleskey, in tandem with the narrow definition of “racial
classifications” evinced by the Court’s treatment of Johnson
and Brown, drastically narrows litigants’ opportunities to challenge the role of race in criminal justice institutions.
The substance of current Equal Protection doctrine, in
short, evinces no concern for either the ecological spillovers of
enforcement actions onto larger racial cohorts. And much like
the Fourth Amendment cases canvassed above, it is heedless of
dynamic effects—except perhaps for its evident concern with
maintaining the criminal-justice status quo. Finally, neither
the rule against racial classification nor the bar to discriminatory motivations takes into account the possibility that officials
are aware that a policy pursued for nonracial ends has a wholly
foreseeable negative effects on other members of a racial or
286
ethnic cohort, or the possibility that race is so pervasively
correlated with nonracial traits—such as residence, socioeconomic status, and the like—that official decision-makers simply
287
cannot disentangle racial from nonracial criteria.
There is something of a puzzle here. In glossing the Equal
Protection Clause, the Court has invoked ideas of racial stig288
289
ma, racial balkanization, and the dignitary interest in be290
ing judged on one’s own merits. And then it has been largely
silent about policing.
285. The Court has also limited discovery respecting evidence of racial bias
in the prosecutorial context to instances in which a defendant can already
point to clear evidence of bias. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,
470 (1996). Armstrong’s somewhat circular standard has been roundly criticized. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 605, 606 (1998) (contending that standard established by the Court in Armstrong is nearly
impossible for many defendants with meritorious claims to satisfy).
286. See Siegel, supra note 43, at 47 (drawing parallel between Feeney and
the doctrine of double effect).
287. See Strauss, supra note 219, at 114–15 (discussing the cognitive consequences of such pervasive correlations).
288. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)
(“Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they
are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of
racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility.”).
289. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
551 U.S. 701, 746 (2007) (expressing concern that the use of racial classifications will exacerbate racial hostility and conflict and will effectively divide the
nation into segments based on race).
290. See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) (“One of the prin-
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But it is not hard to see that SQF, as described in Part I,
implicates each of these concerns. It is, most importantly, often
expressly predicated on a putative relationship between race to
291
criminality. It is indeed explicitly defended on the basis of a
generalization—a stereotype about racial minorities that is not
merely derogatory, but that has historically been a keystone of
discriminatory legal architectures. And its advocates make no
bones that the price of public safety will be borne disproportionately by only some, and only because of the color of their
skin.
Further, it not only thrives upon the festering racial segregation that scars our cities, but it reinforces segregation to the
extent that minorities are subject to increased stops when they
leave their neighborhoods. Quite literally, it echoes and embeds
the balkanization of our cities into black and white quarters.
In addition, thanks to the weak evidentiary threshold of
Terry, it enables police to engage in aggregate deprivations of
individual liberty that are predicated only fractionally on individual behavior and largely on race and place. If one takes the
Court’s justifications on face value, policing tactics such as
SQF, in short, ought to be the sine qua non of what the Equal
Protection Clause prevents.
The Equal Protection doctrine, in conclusion, provides the
moral justifications but not the doctrinal tools for dealing with
SQF. It is beholden to the default narrow and atomistic transactional frame of constitutional doctrine, which shears away
both ecological and dynamic contexts. And ultimately, it lacks
the courage of its notional convictions. For these reasons, it is
not well adapted to the task of fixing SQF.
III. THE DISPARATE-IMPACT LENS ON SQF
This Part turns from critique to a more constructive proposal. Not all instruments to mitigate moral wrongs have to reside in the Constitution. So I look elsewhere.
I argue that a disparate-impact framework of liability, now
found in both federal statutes and state law, provides a bet-

cipal reasons race is treated as a forbidden classification is that it demeans the
dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her
own merit and essential qualities.”).
291. See supra sources cited in note 83 (quoting, inter alia, New York Police Commission Ray Kelly to the effect that it makes sense to stop minorities
because minorities tend to commit crime).

2017]

POLICING DISPARATE POLICING

2457

ter—but not a perfect—framework for analyzing urban streetpolicing policy.
The purpose of the disparate-impact lens advanced here is
diagnostic. It is also second best in the sense that it does not
track the loose cost-benefit analysis that is fleshed out in Part
I: that cost-benefit analysis, in my view, impugns all programmatic use of SQF in racially diverse cities at present. More
modestly, a disparate-impact lens provides a way to identify
when a police department’s programmatic use of Terry stops is
especially likely to be unjustified because it is characterized by
distinctive ecological and dynamic harms. A disparate-impact
lens, in other words, flushes out the subset of municipal policing practices from which the harms identified in Part I are
most likely to flow. It does not flag every instance in which SQF
is unjustified on welfarist terms.
Formally, a disparate-impact framework identifies a set of
policing practices in which the likely proximate costs of SQF
are concentrated on minority communities without an adequately supported justification. The analysis developed in Part
II suggested that the proximate costs of SQF—which include
the hassle and humiliation of stops—are only a fraction of the
total costs of SQF. The latter comprise the larger set of dynamic costs to individuals, families and communities.
But if even the proximate costs of SQF are highly concentrated, it is likely that aggregate costs are also extremely concentrated. Where the state cannot identify a strong public policy justification for that concentration, SQF should be ranked as
legally problematic. More specifically, where the state cannot
adequately make the case that the concentration of SQF responds to a real crime problem, and in fact mitigates that problem, it should be required to reconsider its policing strategy.
In this sense, the avoidance of disparate impact is a modest, second-best demand, which nudges the state’s attention
292
toward the right elements of policing strategy. It invites, that
is, remedial attention to systemic, rather than individualistic,
pathologies. And it avoids the moralizing, and potentially polarizing, language of individual blame and liability.
To flesh out this alternative lens onto SQF, this Part defines and defends disparate-impact liability as a legally available approach for analyzing policing decisions. In particular, I
292. As such it might be applied more generally to policing tactics, including hot-spot policing.
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develop the reasons for which disparate impact is superior to
the currently dominant constitutional approaches described in
Part II. Having dealt with potential objections to its translation
to the policing context, I conclude by sketching how in practice
disparate-impact liability can be applied to SQF.
In practice, a disparate-impact analysis requires econometric studies of the aggregate data about stops, frisks, and other
outcomes, as well as fine-grained judgments about how to specify and interpret such studies. I set forth three general lines of
inquiry that might profitably be applied to such aggregate data
to determine whether a disparate impact exists; I largely
bracket, however, more technical questions of econometric specification. Together, these empirical strategies nevertheless provide a rough template for making disparate impact an effective
and practicable instrument of legal reform.
A. THE AVAILABILITY OF DISPARATE IMPACT
The theory of disparate-impact liability in race discrimination cases is associated with the Supreme Court’s construction
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Griggs v. Duke
293
Power Co. In a somewhat chastened form, it remains availa294
ble to plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases. Disparate impact is also a cognizable theory of liability under the Age
295
and the Fair
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
296
Housing Act (FHA). It can be understood as either an instrument for rooting out bad intent, or as a freestanding
297
ground of liability. Disparate impact is in contrast, a ‘road not
298
taken’ in Equal Protection law.
Disparate-impact liability in the policing context is available under two sets of laws. First, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 prohibits “discrimination under any program or activi293. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
294. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 584 (2009) (requiring “a strong
basis in evidence” to shield employer actions “to avoid violating the disparateimpact provision” from disparate treatment liability under Title VII).
295. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005) (interpreting 29
U.S.C. § 623(a) (1998)).
296. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2513 (2015) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a), 3605(a) (1988)
to permit disparate-impact liability).
297. Primus, supra note 41, at 520–24 (exploring both accounts).
298. See Reva B. Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The
Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111,
1131–35 (1997) (describing rejection of disparate impact).
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299

ty” receiving federal funds. Pursuant to an explicit grant of
rule-making authority under the statute, federal agencies, including the Department of Justice, have promulgated regulations prohibiting disparate racial impacts as well as disparate
300
racial treatment. The Justice Department’s disparate-impact
regulation applies to “any program for which Federal financial
assistance is authorized under a law administered by the De301
partment.” Because local police departments receive federal
funding from “dozens” of separate programs, many adminis302
tered by the Department of Justice, the Title VI bar on disparate impact applies to most state and local police forces. That
prohibition, however, may be enforced by public suits but not
303
via individuals invoking a private right of action. The New
Orleans consent decree and the Baltimore settlement obtained
by the Justice Department, for example, both invoke Title VI
304
authority, albeit in nebulous terms.
Second, at least two states prohibit policing measures with
disparate racial impacts. The Illinois Civil Rights Act, tracking
Title VI’s language and effect, prohibits “discrimination under
any program or activity on the grounds of that person’s race,
305
color, national origin, or gender.” In at least one case, it has
306
been applied to policing decisions. California’s law, which applies to all state programs, prohibits “criteria or methods of
administration that . . . have the purpose or effect of subjecting
299. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1973).
300. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2013) (Dept. of Justice); 49 C.F.R.
§ 21.5(b)(2) (2012) (Dept. of Transp.); Implementation of the Fair Housing
Act’s Discriminatory Effect Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to
be codified at 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.5, 100.70, 100.120, 100.130, 100.500).
301. 28 C.F.R. § 42.103 (2012).
302. Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing,
90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 872 (2015).
303. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). Prior to Sandoval, private
plaintiffs challenged racially disparate policing using Title VI in Maryland
State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Maryland Department of State Police,
72 F. Supp. 2d 560 (D. Md. 1999).
304. New Orleans Decree, supra note 21, at 2; BALTIMORE AGREEMENT,
supra note 23, at 1.
305. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 23/5 (West 2012); see also Jackson v.
Cerpa, 696 F. Supp. 2d 962, 694 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (“[ICRA] was expressly intended to provide a state law remedy that was identical to the federal disparate impact canon.”); accord McFadden v. Bd. of Educ. for Ill. Sch. Dist. U-46,
984 F. Supp. 2d 882, 890 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
306. For an example of a civil suit based on this provision, see Central Austin Neighborhood Association v. City of Chicago, 1 N.E. 3d 976, 984 (Ill. Ap. Ct.
2013) (refusing to dismiss suit on political question grounds).
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a person to discrimination on the basis of ethnic group identification, religion, age, sex, color, or a physical or mental disabil307
ity.”
Disparate impact is commonly framed as a three-step
analysis. In the employment-discrimination context, a prima
facie case is established by showing that a specific employment
practice caused racial disparities in a salient outcome meas308
ure. A racial disparity is gauged by comparing employment
309
rates in an employer’s workforce with the qualified labor pool
310
or the applicant pool, rather than to the general population.
Agencies interpreting Title VII have long used a four-fifth rule
311
to single out cognizable disparities. The Supreme Court has
approvingly cited this interpretation, adding that a simple
“significant statistical disparity, and nothing more” is needed
312
at the threshold.
This prima facie case, however, may be rebutted by evidence that “the challenged practice is job related for the posi313
tion in question and consistent with business necessity.” This

307. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 1154(h)(i) (2017). Subsection c of the same
provision also makes it unlawful to “provide a person with an aid, benefit or
service that is not as effective in affording an equal opportunity to obtain the
same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of achievement as that provided to others. In some situations, identical treatment may
be discriminatory.” Id. § 1154(c).
308. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (2012) (requiring the identification of “a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact”). The causation
element reflects the Court’s ruling in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, which
has been abandoned in other respects. 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989) (“As a general
matter, a plaintiff must demonstrate that it is the application of a specific or
particular employment practice that has created the disparate impact under
attack.”).
309. See, e.g., Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 456 (4th Cir. 1994) (“In a case of
discrimination in hiring or promoting, the relevant comparison is between the
percentage of minority employees and the percentage of potential minority applicants in the qualified labor pool.”); accord Lopez v. Laborers Int’l Union Local No. 18, 987 F.2d 1210, 1216 (5th Cir. 1993); Shidaker v. Tisch, 833 F.2d
627, 631 (7th Cir. 1986).
310. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 458 (1982) (comparing racial composition of those entering the selection process with that of people ultimately promoted); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)
(requiring that plaintiffs “show[ ] that the tests in question select applicants
for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the
pool of applicants” (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802 (1973))).
311. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1978).
312. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 587 (2009) (citations omitted).
313. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1).
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defense, however, is overcome if there is a legitimate alternative employment practice that will result in less discrimina314
tion.
B. THE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE OF DISPARATE IMPACT
Black-letter constitutional law largely ignores the ecological and dynamic aspects of SQF. It therefore fails to provide a
useful analytic lens for determining when and how urban street
policing is a moral wrong.
Why would a disparate-impact lens do any better? It is not
a form of cost-benefit analysis of the kind developed above, after all. Rather, a disparate-impact analysis is appropriate here
because it is a way to isolate the proximate costs of a policy (excluding, that is, its social, familial, and intergenerational effects) and to compare those to its affirmative policy justifications. In the policing context, disparate impact thus weighs a
subcategory of the costs imposed on minority populations
against almost all the crime-control related benefits of the policy. Given its failure to capture the full range of costs adumbrated in Part II, and given that it will likely account for most
of the benefits of SQF, a disparate-impact lens is likely to be
radically under-inclusive: it will only capture a subset of cases
in which SQF imposes a moral wrong.
Nevertheless, there are three reasons for thinking that
disparate impact is a better fit for identifying the distinctive
moral wrong of SQF identified in Part I even if it does not track
precisely a cost-benefit analysis.
First, disparate-impact liability is at least focused on aggregate, rather than individual, outcomes. It is panoramic rather than microscopic. The institutional focus of disparate impact widens the array of relevant institutional decisions that
can be considered as causes of harm. Policing is not simply a
matter of officers on the street, making ad hoc decisions. Like
any other complex organizations, a police force is channeled
through policies, practices, and bureaucratic norms developed
at competing institutional nodes, from city hall to chief of police’s office to the precinct-house. The capacious lens used by
disparate impact captures more relevant state actions than an
approach focused on bad motives.
Analysis under a wide-angle disparate-impact rubric is also not limited to the consequences of a discrete individual’s ac314. Id.
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tion. It focuses more capaciously on all “the effects of [a] . . .
315
practice.” SQF, as I have described it in Part I, need not rest
on pernicious individual motivations to generate a distinctive
moral wrong. Rather, that wrong can flow from the “effects” of
institutional policies and practices. Disparate impact is sensitive to a wide range of effects, and is in particular able to capture the interaction between past distributions and present policing practice. An institutional practice, such as SQF, will
produce different effects depending on the context to which is
applied. When employed in a fashion that tracks patterns of existing racial segregation, its race-related patterns will be different from an application that cuts across extant forms of racial stratification. This difference is captured in the broad scope
of disparate-impact analysis, which accounts for history, as
well as institutional context, in a way that discriminatory
treatment analysis cannot.
Second, disparate-impact analysis focuses attention on the
morally relevant question of whether the crime-control benefits
of the policy as a whole justify its costs. Once a racial effect is
identified at the threshold, the second step of the disparateimpact analysis involves careful consideration of the affirmative justifications for the disparity. In effect, the analysis
roughly weighs positives against negatives.
In the discriminatory treatment context, by contrast, there
is no opportunity to identify or weigh all relevant costs. As a
result, when a race-based criteria is used, as in Brown v. City of
316
Oneonta, a Court inclined to permit race-based suspect descriptions as cost-justified will find it easier to avoid strict scrutiny by declining to perceive a racial classification at work in
317
the first instance. On the other side of the ledger, disparateimpact analysis also considers the aggregate outcomes of a policy. In the SQF context, for example, this would mean counts of
the numbers of different racial groups who are stopped.
Again, it is important to emphasize that this is not a full
tally of the ecological and dynamic spillovers from aggressive
315. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2015) (second emphasis added).
316. 221 F.3d 329, 334 (2d Cir. 2000).
317. Indeed, the Brown Court’s argument that no racial classification was
at work because the suspect description also mentioned gender, as Richard
Primus explains, simply “cannot be right,” because it implies that “what would
be a racial classification standing alone is not a racial classification if the racial criterion is combined with nonracial criteria.” Primus, supra note 41, at
511.
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SQF policing. But it accounts for the policy’s sheer size—and
hence reflects, at least approximately, the effect of a large
number of minority stops on self-worth, residential patterns,
and the diffusion of stereotypical beliefs about the links between race and crime far better than a legal framework
pinched to fit cleanly around individual motives.
Finally, disparate-impact liability obviates the need to
make controversial judgments about individuals’ intentions, beliefs, and attitudes. By focusing attention on these elusive psychological facts, both Terry and Feeney invite self-deception and
perjury on the part of police and municipal policymakers. The
Feeney framework in particular also ratchets up emotional
stakes by predicating a remedy on the finding that a specific
person is motivated by discriminatory intent, a standard that
has the potential to induce backlash within regulated entities
318
such as police forces. By honing in upon consequentialist criteria instead, the disparate-impact standard obviates loaded,
and easily deflected, allegations of bad intent, even as it draws
salutary attention to the deeper and more enduring costs of
SQF.
To be clear, no judicially enforceable theory of liability will
provide a panacea to the problem of concentrated racialized
poverty, or the complex network of state action and inaction
that created and perpetuated it. The case for disparate-impact
liability in the policing context rests on the more modest claim
that it captures a wider array of morally relevant costs and
benefits than the available alternatives. It does not imply perfection.
C. THE OBJECTIONS TO DISPARATE IMPACT IN THE POLICING
CONTEXT
Three objections to the application of disparate-impact liability to the policing context are worth resolving before turning
to the nitty-gritty of application. They concern its constitutionality, its efficacy, and the availability of popular support.
To begin with, there has recently been a question about the
constitutionality of disparate-impact liability, even though in
its infancy in the 1970s it was understood as an important

318. External control efforts, such as individual blame and liability, tend to
increase certain forms of racial bias. See Lisa Legault et al., Ironic Effects of
Antiprejudice Messages: How Motivational Interventions Can Reduce (but Also
Increase) Prejudice, 22 PSYCH. SCI. 1472, 1472–75 (2011).
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319

strand of Equal Protection law. Paradoxically, at least one
member of the Court has intimated that disparate impact
might itself violate the Equal Protection Clause because it forc320
es race consciousness. Nevertheless, more recent precedent
suggests that there is “no constitutional problem in the existence of disparate impact prohibitions,” but that “those prohibi321
tions might raise such problems in their application.” In particular, the Court has suggested that the second step of the
analysis—the proffer of legitimate justifications for a disparity—is key.
In glossing the FHA’s disparate impact prong, the Court in
its 2015 Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs
v. Inclusive Communities Project opinion cautioned that constitutional problems would arise if “liability were imposed based
322
solely on a showing of a statistical disparity.” Rather, it is only “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers” that legiti323
mately and constitutionally trigger such liability. This places
great stress on the opportunity a defendant must have in a disparate impact proceeding to point to “[non-]arbitrary” and
324
“[]necessary” grounds for a justification. More specifically, a
regression analysis used to identify a race effect must include
325
controls for legitimate justifications for a disparity.
319. Siegel, supra note 43, at 11–13 (noting that in the 1970s, “equal protection law did not sharply distinguish proof of purpose and proof of impact”).
320. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“Title VII’s disparate-impact provisions place a racial thumb on the scales,
often requiring employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of their policies, and
to make decisions based on (because of ) those racial outcomes. That type of
racial decisionmaking is, as the Court explains, discriminatory.”).
321. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disparate Impact and the Role of Classification
and Motivation in Equal Protection Law After Inclusive Communities, 101
CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1129 (2016).
322. 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015).
323. Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
324. An alternative formulation of this concern is that disparate impact
does not “operate to encourage regulated entities to classify individuals based
on race.” Bagenstos, supra note 321, at 1130. Whereas in the employment context, the shadow of disparate-impact liability might push employers toward
the use of quotas, it is hard to see how disparate impact would have this effect
in the policing context. To the contrary, in the absence of disparate impact,
SQF is arguably best understood as motivated by implicit quotas.
325. Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400–01 & n.10 (1986) (requiring
controls for “major factors”). Lower courts have stressed the need to avoid controls for anything other than a legitimate justification. See, e.g., Anderson v.
Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 406 F.3d 248, 280 (4th Cir. 2005)
(“[S]tatistical evidence does not have to control for every single variable in order to be sufficient.”).
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A second concern raised by a number of recent commentators is that “the disparate impact theory has produced no substantial social change and there is no reason to think that extending the theory to other contexts would have produced
326
meaningful reform.” A common thread uniting these concerns
is the premise that courts are unwilling to “broadly restructure
327
social institutions” or interfere with the private intra-firm or328
dering.
To be sure, the frailty of the judicial will to enforce constitutional norms on behalf of disfavored groups cannot be overstated. Nevertheless, blanket pessimism is unwarranted for
two reasons.
To begin with, several cities are already operating under
consent decrees or settlements that either include an independent monitor or envisage much judicially supervised reorganiza329
tion of street policing. Further, there is no reason to think
that municipal officials involved in the negotiation and operationalizing of these deals lack any interest at all in mitigating
the fierce public pressure to diminish the racial tensions of urban policing. The application of disparate-impact liability provides a more cogent way for them to understand how to do so
than available alternatives.
In addition, precise agency regulations, such as those issued in 2015 under the FHA, have the potential “to stabilize
disparate-impact law and to provide clarity to regulated enti330
ties subject to different judicial standards.” There is no reason such stabilization cannot be achieved in the policing context through more specific Justice Department regulations
326. Selmi, supra note 57, at 705. For similar diagnoses, see Samuel R.
Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94
CAL. L. REV. 1, 45 (2006) (“Disparate impact doctrine has been in a massive
decline over the past few decades.”); Tracy E. Higgins & Laura A. Rosenbury,
Agency, Equality, and Antidiscrimination Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1194,
1204–07 (2000) (similarly bemoaning “the decline of disparate impact”).
327. Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 396
(2007).
328. Selmi, supra note 57, at 708 (“Taking seriously the disparate impact
theory would have posed a substantial challenge to existing practices, which is
precisely why the theory never has been taken particularly seriously by
courts.”); see also Bagenstos, supra note 326 (making a similar point by noting
that courts dislike any departure from a “fault-based” theory of discrimination
liability).
329. See supra text accompanying notes 17–26.
330. Olatunde C.A. Johnson, The Agency Roots of Disparate Impact, 49
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 125, 127 (2014).
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(however unlikely these might be in the near term). Indeed, the
more granular account of how to think about disparate impact
in the context of policing data that follows in Part III.C itself
can do double duty by providing a framework for such regulations.
Finally, it might be argued that broad support for aggressive street policing within minority communities provides a sufficient justification for racially disparate allocation of Terry
331
stops. If the very communities that suffer the costs of intensive policing also clamor for such policing, the moral case for
disparate-impact liability seems thin indeed. Yet evidence for
community demand in the context of SQF is thin on the ground.
Protests in Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia about stop
and frisk have been led by organizations from minority com332
More generally, to the extent that Africanmunities.
American political leaders have sought increased policing,
there have been “accompanying demands to redirect power and
333
economic resources to low-income minority communities.” But
“[w]hen blacks ask for better policing, legislators tend to hear
334
more instead.” Disparate-impact liability is more sensitive to
the marginal crime-control benefits attached to SQF, as well as
its costs. It is therefore a sensible way to reconcile minority
communities’ demands for both better public security and also
freedom for excessive street policing cannot.
D. DISPARATE IMPACT IN ACTION
This final Section sketches how a disparate-impact analysis of SQF data might be put into action. Its twofold aim is to
show that such inquiries are feasible, and to start to make pro-

331. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated
Procedural Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
197, 197–98 (celebrating African-American communities’ demand for more policing).
332. Leland & Moynihan, supra note 14 (noting African-American leadership in protests in New York); Leonor Vivanco, 5 Young Chicago Activists Answer 5 Questions About the Movement, REDEYE (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www
.redeyechicago.com/news/redeye-five-activists-answer-five-questions-20160122
-story.html (profiling leaders of anti-SQF movement in Chicago).
333. Elizabeth Hinton et al., Did Blacks Back the Crime Bill?, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 13, 2016, at A25.
334. Id.; see also ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE
WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 134–38,
322–23 (2016) (tracing the “war on black crime” back to the Nixon and Reagan
administrations’ policies).
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gress on some of the knotty theoretical puzzles raised by disparate impact’s implementation.
To set the stage for this inquiry, it is useful to consider its
practical context. The settlements in Philadelphia and Chicago,
which were both reached without information-generating litigation, require ongoing collection of extensive data concerning
the timing, justifications, suspect demographics, and conse335
quences of stops. How might this data be interrogated for evidence of disparate impact? How concretely can one inquiry into
whether a discrete practice or policy causes a racially disparate
impact that is not justified on legitimate and necessary grounds
be executed?
In answering these questions, I focus on the theoretical
questions of what kinds of disparities should count, not more
technical questions of econometric identification strategy.
A disparate racial impact can result from one of three elements of policing strategy. Each of the latter warrants separate
and distinct analysis. At each level, racial disparities salient to
the distinctive moral wrong of SQF can emerge. And at each
level, the state can also avail itself of different legitimate justifications for the disparity. If anything, the feasible analytic
tools favor the state as a result. Disparate-impact analysis, in
the fashion developed here, is decisively under-inclusive insofar
as it does not capture all the ecological and dynamic externalities from SQF. The availability of plural tests to capture a racially disparate effect only partially compensate for this lacuna.
Nevertheless, it is the best extant doctrinal framework for the
problem, and also likely superior to anything that can be created from scratch in current political conditions.
For the purpose of illustration here, I hypothesize a municipal jurisdiction that has just entered a consent decree. We can
assume that like New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago, this
municipality is racially and economically segregated, with race
and socioeconomic status closely covarying. We can also assume
that the city is divided into precincts, which are the foundational elements of the geographic allocation of police. The municipality’s SQF, as in real-life cases, is directed at neighborhoods of concentrated poverty and high crime—which are also
predominantly minority. The municipality is required to gather
data about stops of the kind elicited by the Chicago and Phila-

335. Philadelphia Settlement, supra note 19, ¶ II.B; Chicago Settlement,
supra note 18, ¶ I.1.
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delphia settlements. I will assume police collect that data faith336
fully. I focus here on the legal question of what questions can
be asked of the resulting data.
I discuss each three levels of analysis in turn. For each level, I identify the relevant element of state policy or practice; the
outcome across which racial disparities may be observed; and
the range of feasible justifications a municipality might offer.
Where possible, I also note if the question has been examined
in an existing study or litigation.
1. Between-Precinct Disparities
The first level of analysis that should be tested is the rate
of SQF deployment by precinct. Recall that the core justification for SQF tendered by its defenders is that street police are
deployed where crime occurs; racial disparities arise only be337
cause crime is concentrated in minority neighborhoods.
But this may not be the case. Perceptions of crime can also
338
be a function of the racial composition of a neighborhood. A
threshold policy decision to be tested is the volume of Terry
stop per precinct with a lagged measure of crime as a control.
This is a way of determining whether the geographical distribution of policing resources turns on racial demographics or
339
crime rates.
For example, Jeffrey Fagan tested whether the number of
stops per precinct in New York City was disproportionate to the
racial composition of the precinct, after controlling for several
340
different types of historical crime rate. His analysis suggested
that crime-based justification for SQF’s allocation was un341
Using an ordinary least squares regression, he
founded.
336. This is a rather ambitious assumption. Jeffrey Fagan, Law, Social
Science, and Racial Profiling, 4 JUST. RES. & POL. 103, 112 (2002) (expressing
concerns on this front).
337. See sources cited supra note 83.
338. See sources cited supra notes 194–95.
339. Cf. Sarath Sanga, Does Officer Race Matter?, 16 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
403, 405 (2014) (finding in a study of Oakland street policing that “where one
is stopped may be more important than by whom one is stopped” (emphasis
omitted)).
340. Fagan Report, supra note 51.
341. Id. at 33 tbl. 5. The main regression Fagan presents contains a control
for patrol strength, while one of the sensitivity tests omits that variable. To
the extent that this analysis seeks to ascertain whether deployments at the
precinct level are justified, the inclusion of patrol strength creates a potential
included variable problem. Stated otherwise, patrol strength is a function of
deployment levels, not a justification of the latter.

2017]

POLICING DISPARATE POLICING

2469

found that the percentage of African-American residents was a
stronger predictor of Terry stop volume than lagged rates of
violent crime, narcotics offices, weapons offenses and tres342
pass. Only property and quality-of-life rates outperformed
343
race as predictors of stop volume. This is an especially striking result given SQF’s justification in the wake of the Kansas
City Experiment as a means of reducing violent crime, and as
344
an alternative to broken windows policing.
It is also striking because the assumption that an increase
in crime rates should predict a subsequent increase in street
stops is dubious insofar as it stacks the deck in the state’s favor
in a normative troubling way. The use of lagged crime rates as
a control assumes that the only available, or perhaps the best
available, policing response to upticks in crime concern is more
intensive street policing.
345
But this is false. As I have argued, the evidence that SQF
has a large crime-control effect is weak, especially in compari346
son to alternative policing instruments. The use of crime
rates as a baseline further assumes that Terry stops are responsive to all species of violent crime. But at least for the proportion of violent crimes that occur within the home against
partners or other intimates, it is hard to see how Terry stops
347
are responsive. In short, there is no good reason to assume
the best, only, or most effective response to rising crime rates in
a specific neighborhood is to increase the number of people be348
ing stopped.
A between-precinct measure of racial disparities can be
combined with a range of other measures to develop a more nuanced rendering of how policing resources are allocated across
geographic areas. Hence, simple descriptive statistics can provide useful confirmatory evidence, even if they cannot on their
342. Id. at 41, 31 n.52, 43. Fagan also presents a series of charts showing
stop rates per crime complaints by minority population share. Id. at 25–27.
These illustrate the same disparity.
343. Id. at 45.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 94, 74 (describing, respectively,
the Kansas City Experiment and Broken Windows policing).
345. See supra text accompanying notes 126–34.
346. See supra Part I.B.2.
347. Other studies have found that citizen complaints of drug transactions
do not predict narcotics-related deployment rates. Katherine Beckett et al.,
Race, Drugs, and Policing: Understanding Disparities in Drug Delivery Arrests, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 105, 126–27 (2006).
348. For a further set of criticisms, see Fagan, supra note 336, at 117–18.
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own prove disparate-impact liability consistent with Inclusive
349
Communities. The data might be further interrogated by
comparing the determinants of precinct-level deployments with
350
the rate of stops per resident, conditional on racial identity.
Where such citywide tests find that not only do minority neighborhoods bear a disproportionate toll of stops, but minority individuals also bear a larger share of those stops, there is reason
for concern that SQF is not only regressive in effect, but also
triggers the dynamic, vicious-circle processes described in Part
I.C.
In addition, the between-precinct distribution of street policing is usefully contrasted with the distribution of other policing resources. If precincts that receive intensive Terry treatments, for example, are associated with lower rates of other
policing measures—e.g., they have fewer officers deployed
across both reactive and proactive policing, or they have persistently longer wait times for 911 calls—then there is further
reason for skepticism that crime control simpliciter in fact explains or justifies racial disparities in stops across geographic
subunits within the municipality.
2. Within-Precinct Disparities
The next level of analysis focuses on the distribution of
Terry stops by racial or ethnic group within a precinct. Between-precinct tests are incomplete because even if there are
no between-precinct disparities, a disparate racial impact
might emerge within a given precinct if racial minorities engaged in the same (potentially criminal) conduct as nonminorities are more likely, holding all else constant, to be
stopped or otherwise policed than non-minorities in the same
position.
The intuition that racial minorities may be overpoliced in
comparison to similar non-minority citizens is easy to see in the
context of racially heterogeneous, central business districts,
where minority citizens may be perceived as categorically out of

349. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015) (noting that constitutional problems would arise
if “liability were imposed based solely on a showing of a statistical disparity”).
350. IAN AYRES & JONATHAN BOROWSKY, A STUDY OF RACIALLY DISPARATE
OUTCOMES IN THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 9–10 (2008), https://
www.aclusocal.org/en/study-racially-disparate-outcomes-los-angeles-police
-department.
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place and hence suspicious. But the same disparity can arise
even in poorer, majority-minority neighborhoods.
A pair of studies of narcotics policing in Seattle by Katherine Beckett and her colleagues nicely illustrate how race
might figure in within-precinct dynamics in this way. Their
first study demonstrated (among other things) that in the Capitol Hill neighborhood of Seattle, three percent of those purchasing narcotics were African American, while 20.5% of those ar351
rested were African American.
Their second study found that predominantly white outdoor drug markets received “far less attention” from police than
racially diverse ones, such that the “geographic concentration of
law enforcement resources [was] a significant cause of racial
352
Indeed, a qualitative component of the study
disparity.”
found that police officers flagged one racially diverse crack
market while failing to mention a similar but “overwhelmingly
353
white” market for prescription drugs operating alongside it.
Of special note here, Beckett and her collaborators explicitly consider the possibility that differences in the policing of
crack cocaine and prescription drug markets may have been
354
due to different levels of associated violence. They find, however, that the association between crack and violence “does not
appear to have existed in Seattle during the period under in355
vestigation.”
These studies’ findings echo sociological findings of how racial composition often predicts perceptions of crime, and historical findings about the deep roots of stereotypes of black criminality. They demonstrate the importance of a nuanced and
contextualized analysis of what is happening within heavily policed neighborhoods, rather than a blasé assumption that heavy
policing in high-crime neighborhoods is necessarily evenhanded or efficacious.
A within-precinct analysis usefully considers whether the
rate of minority stops is better predicted by legitimate policing
grounds or suspects’ race, conditional on certain precinct level
characteristics. Within a pool of stop-related data, the number
of stops per ethnic group within a given time period would be
351. Katherine Beckett et al., Drug Use, Drug Possession Arrests, and the
Question of Race: Lessons from Seattle, 52 SOC. PROBS. 419, 435 (2005).
352. Beckett et al., supra note 347, at 129.
353. Id. at 130.
354. Beckett et al., supra note 351, at 433.
355. Id.
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the outcome (i.e., dependent) variable to be explained. For a
given precinct, one could ask whether there is a statistically
significant correlation between the rate of stops and the fact
individual suspects are African American or Hispanic rather
than white, after controlling for relevant precinct-level characteristics. Some existing studies deploy a method called multilevel modeling to control simultaneously for individual and pre357
I will assume that approach is valid,
cinct-level factors.
although nothing rests on that assumption so long as some
parallel econometric technique is available.
The pivotal question for such multilevel models is the
choice of control variables to capture “[non-]arbitrary” and
358
“[]necessary” justifications. A disparate-impact model should
include only control variables that provide normatively valid
justifications for a within-precinct racial disparity.
In this regard, it is fundamentally dissimilar from tests for
discriminatory motives. A regression-based test for the latter
operates by excluding all possible explanations for a stop except
for the race of a suspect. The study employed in the New York
litigation, for example, controls for the foreign-born proportion
of a precinct, socioeconomic status, and the presence of a busi359
ness district. But a racial disparate impact, as a matter of
law, arises not only when there is no other possible explanation
for a racial gap in stop rates. It additionally arises when there
is no legitimate explanation related to policing goals for that
gap.
In this regard, the economic analysis of disparate impacts
is unlike the large array of econometric studies that focus on a
“causal if-then question” and treat randomized trials as an
360
“ideal.” Variables such as the socioeconomic character of a
356. See, e.g., Fagan Report, supra note 51, at 40–42, 42 tbl. 7 (reporting
the results of a multilevel Poisson regression on stops by suspected crime controlling for precinct characteristics and lagged crime conditions).
357. Multilevel modeling describes a school of approaches for including
both micro- and macro-level factors in the same equation to explain a single
dependent variable. Thomas A. DiPrete & Jerry D. Forristal, Multilevel Models: Methods and Substance, 20 ANN. REV. SOC. 331, 332–33 (1994).
358. See supra text accompanying notes 323–24.
359. Fagan Report, supra note 51, at 42, tbl. 7; see also AYRES &
BOROWSKY, supra note 350, at 37–38, tbl. 7.
360. JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JÖRN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS
ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPIRICIST’S COMPANION 11–12 (2009). For this reason,
the propensity score matching models used in some policing studies are not
suitable for disparate-impact analysis. See Fagan Report, supra note 51, at
97–100 (noting and criticizing the use of such models elsewhere).
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precinct, its foreign-born populace, and officer race have no
361
place in disparate-impact analysis. Their inclusion leads to
“included variable bias” insofar as they “would not plausibly
362
justify a racial disparity in outcomes.” Even when included in
disparate treatment analyses, they result in “bloated statistical
models so chock-full of covariates (i.e., control variables) that
363
any evidence of disparate treatment disappears.”
In several existing studies, lagged crime or violent crime
rates are used as the baseline control in this sort of multilevel
364
model. This parameter at least relates directly to the notional
justification that a municipality has for increased street stops—
i.e., crime-related patterns—subject to the concerns raised
365
above. It captures the ways in which deployment levels might
fluctuate in response to shifts in the geographic distribution of
crime.
It is also likely to be superior to a benchmark of lagged ar366
rest rates, which is employed in some models. The latter are
potentially influenced by officers’ racial beliefs. To this end, a
recent metastudy of the effect of suspect race on arrest decisions found that minorities are at least thirty percent more
367
likely to be arrested as similar non-minority suspects. Historical arrest rates thus provide a distorted baseline, which obscures potential racial disparities in stops by implicitly controlling for officer bias.
It is worth underscoring once more that the racial composition of the pool of those suspected of a crime, or arrested for a
crime is by no means an unproblematic benchmark for the racial composition of those subject to a Terry stop even within a
particular neighborhood. The best argument from using such
361. The racial composition of a precinct is a relevant control if it proxies
for the expected composition of persons on the street—an assumption that will
not hold in downtowns or transit hubs.
362. AYRES & BOROWSKY, supra note 350, at 13; see also Ian Ayres, Testing
for Discrimination and the Problem of “Included Variable Bias” 3–4 (2008)
(unpublished manuscript), http://ianayres.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/
Testing%20for%20Discrimination.pdf.
363. OAKLAND REPORT, supra note 26, at 6.
364. See Fagan Report, supra note 51, at 42; AYRES & BOROWSKY, supra
note 350, at 34. A possible variant on these reports’ approaches is lagged rates
of gun crime, which bear on the violent crime-related justification at times offered for SQF.
365. See supra text accompanying notes 345–47.
366. See Gelman et al., supra note 51.
367. Tammy Rinehart Kochel et al., Effect of Suspect Race on Officers’ Arrest Decisions, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 473, 498 (2011).

2474

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:2397

data as a benchmark, in my view, focuses solely on racial composition of the local violent offender population. It hypothesizes
that police focus either on people or places associated with
higher violent crime risk. Given racial segregation and racial
divides between social groups, it is then predicted that the racial composition of the stopped population will track that of the
at-risk population.
Setting aside questions about the efficacy of SQF generally
as a crime-control measure, there are nonetheless three reasons for skepticism of even this benchmark. First, this logic assumes that municipalities can accurately zero in on not just
places but persons who present a risk of violence. It is not clear
that this is so. For example, a recent study of Chicago’s “Strategic Subjects” List, which was used in this fashion, found that
individuals on the city’s list were no more or less likely to be
368
victimized by violence than a control group.
Second, if SQF focuses on places rather than persons, the
number of individuals involved in violent crime is still a small
369
fraction of the volume of people stopped. In the exceptionally
bloody month of August 2016 in Chicago, for example, ninety
370
people were killed by gunfire. The number of stops that
month was likely at least two orders of magnitude greater.
Even assuming that the Chicago police in that month were focused accurately on corners where violence was likely to occur,
more than one hundred instances of reasonable articulable
suspicion were being targeted for every one act of violence. And
even if police then have reason to anticipate a particular corner
or street will witness violence, at a minimum some ninety-nine
out of every one hundred stops will have no relation to that violence. Historical patterns of violence cannot explain why reasonable articulable suspicion existed for those individuals. The
racial demographics of violent crimes or violent crime-related

368. Jessica Saunders et al., Predictions Put into Practice: A QuasiExperimental Evaluation of Chicago’s Predictive Policing Pilot, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 347, 347 (2016).
369. For evidence of the very small number of those involved in gun violence, see Andrew V. Papachristos et al., Tragic, but Not Random: The Social
Contagion of Nonfatal Gunshot Injuries, 125 SOC. SCI. & MED. 139, 139 (2015)
(finding nonfatal gun injuries were confined to “less than 6 percent” of Chicago’s population).
370. Jeremy Gorner, After 90 Killed in August, Chicago May Soon Pass
Last Year’s Homicide Toll, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www
.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-chicago-homicides-august
-20160901-story.html.
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arrests on a given street or corner do not necessarily predict the
racial distribution of reasonable articulable suspicion that police can witness at any given moment in time. For most stops,
most of the time, therefore, it seems likely that historical crime
rates will be orthogonal to the incidence of a Terry stop.
Finally, imagine a municipality that affirmatively directs
its police to engage in a pattern of stops that mimics the racial
distribution of violent crime offenders. In many contexts, that
distribution will skew heavily towards African Americans (and
to a lesser extent Hispanics). This is, in effect a system of racial
quotas where some large fraction of those subject to state coercion suffer that fate based solely on their race rather than their
own past conduct. Especially given the weak empirical support
for SQF’s efficacy, such a policy raises stark Equal Protection
concerns even under the Supreme Court’s current highly re371
strictive view of the doctrine.
Instead of using crime rates, violent crime rates, or analogous arrest rates as a benchmark of just policing, therefore, a
study of disparate impact would ideally track Beckett and colleagues’ Seattle study in estimating the racial composition of
the baseline population subject to police action through ethnographic observation (of open-air drug markets) and other
372
means. Ideally, that is, data would be sampled, perhaps from
police body-cameras, to estimate the racial composition of the
population observed on patrol for whom reasonable articulable
suspicion obtained.
If, like police in Beckett’s studies, officers tended to ignore
non-minority offenders while stopping minority offenders, a
within-precinct disparity would be established with certainty.
Such an approach is hardly impossible. Indeed, a recent study
of Oakland policing used text analysis of sound recordings from
officers’ body-cameras to identify differential racial treatment
373
of citizens during street encounters.
3. Within- and Between-Officer Disparities
Finally, racial disparities can emerge not only at the ag374
gregate levels of between- and within-precincts. They can also

371. See supra text accompanying notes 268–72.
372. Beckett et al., supra note 351, at 422–23; Beckett et al., supra note
347, at 116–18.
373. OAKLAND REPORT, supra note 26, at 15–19.
374. See, e.g., id. at 11–12 (describing between-officer disparities).
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arise either because some (or all) officers within a precinct differentiate between minority and non-minority suspects without
a legitimate justification. This level of police action—which
comprises the dispersed exercise of individual officers’ discretion—demands attention to the specific sequence of distinct police actions embedded within a particular interaction, ranging
from the decision to stop, the decision to frisk, the use of force,
and the imposition of subsequent consequences such as citations or arrests. Given the existence of outstanding warrants as
a reason for arrests, however, the latter are a particularly
tricky variable to analyze because they may be unrelated to the
initial stop.
I sketch here the most promising approaches for identifying racial disparities at the individual officer level. I then caution against the use of the most popular economic model of police stops, commonly known as the KPT model, as neither
apposite nor realistic as a framework for analyzing SQF.
Individual officers might create racially disparate effects in
two distinct ways. First, the Terry standard of reasonable articulable suspicion is a vague term with a range of possible cal375
ibrations. Some or all officers might apply stronger or weaker
evidentiary predicates for stops of different racial groups. Second, as Fryer’s powerful analysis of New York policing demonstrates, officers might differentially treat minorities who have
been stopped by employing a greater quantum of violence. Other outcomes, such as citations and arrests, might also be disparately allocated. Disparities in both stop rates and post-stop
outcomes should be analyzed in a disparate-impact analysis.
On the stop-rate question, a simple measure is to rerun the
multilevel models used for within-precinct disparities using officers rather than precincts as the relevant unit of analysis and
lagged crime rates (measured at the smallest available geo376
graphic unit) as a control. A parallel analysis can be run for
377
outcomes, such as the seizure of contraband or firearms.
Again, included variable bias would result if controls other
than legitimate policing justification (such as the lagged-crimerate measure) were included.

375. See supra text accompanying notes 221–24.
376. This has been done in a number of earlier studies. AYRES &
BOROWSKY, supra note 350, at 22; Fagan Report, supra note 51, at 65–69.
377. Id. at 69–71.
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Alternatively, a more promising approach involves the use
of the “stop-level hit rate” (SHR) or the ex-ante probability of
discovering contraband or a weapon based on what an officer
378
Focusing on weapons-related stops,
knows before a stop.
Sharad Goel and his colleagues first use two years’ worth of
historical stop forms to calculate the actual probability of finding a weapon for various combinations of factors listed on stop
forms as the basis of “reasonable articulable suspicion” (along
379
with location, timing, and local hit-rate data). This enables
them to calculate the distribution of ex-ante probabilities of
finding weapons for minorities and non-minorities, both in gen380
eral and holding location constant. In effect, by comparing the
distribution of SHRs for blacks and whites, they show that the
effective quantum of reasonable articulable suspicion for minor381
ities is lower than that for non-minorities. The same analysis
might be executed by precinct or by officer to determine if racial
disparities are either geographically concentrated or the work
of a small fraction of officers.
Rather than following Goel’s lead, the economics literature
is dominated by a model by John Knowles, Nicola Persico, and
382
Petra Todd known as the KPT model. In capsule form, KPT is
a game-theoretical model of traffic stops in which police seek to
maximize arrests and both black and white motorists maximize
contraband. Police observe race. Both they and motorists strategically anticipate the other’s actions. KPT predicts a Nash
equilibrium in which blacks and whites are stopped at different
rates, while the probability of finding contraband (i.e., the hit
383
rate) across groups is equal.
The force of the KPT model is to show how what at first
seems a racial disparity—unequal stop rates—is in fact explained by dynamic strategic action by both police and motor384
ists. As a correlative, differences in hit rates provide evidence
of taste-based discrimination.
378. Goel et al., Combatting Police Discrimination, supra note 52, at 6.
379. Goel et al., Precinct or Prejudice?, supra note 52, at 371–73.
380. Goel et al., Combatting Police Discrimination, supra note 52, at 40–51.
381. Id. at 9–10 (“49% of the stops of blacks fell below the 1% probability
threshold . . . but only 19% of the stops of whites.”).
382. Knowles et al., supra note 33, at 205–07; see also Nicola Persico &
Petra E. Todd, The Hit Rate Test for Racial Bias in Motor-Vehicle Searches, 25
JUST. Q. 37, 39–42 (2008).
383. See Persico & Todd, supra note 382 at 42.
384. Id. (“[If ] hit rates are equalized [across groups], then disparities in
search frequencies across groups, while possible, are not the result of police
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For a number of reasons, though, the KPT model is not
well suited to identify the core wrong of racially disparate policing. To begin with, KPT is “informative only about bias in
385
searches, not in stops.” It is also a model for detecting tastebased discrimination, or animus, rather than the use of race as
an accurate generalization or the disparate racial impact of an386
other factor (e.g., socioeconomic status). Stated otherwise, it
387
ignores all negative externalities from race-based policing.
Even in this more limited compass, its core equilibrium concept
rests on the questionable assumption that police and motorists’
388
know of, and dynamically adapt to, each other’s behavior. Extensions of their work that vary the models show that equal hit
389
rates might also be consistent with racial animus.
Because the modeling assumptions of KPT are so controversial, and its implications so fragile in the face of subtle
changes in relevant actors’ information and motivation, in my
view it does not provide a useful lens even for the limited question of whether there is animus-based searches in the first instance.

bias.”).
385. Id.
386. Engel, supra note 62, at 3.
387. Durlauf, supra note 151, at F407.
388. For example, the KPT model assumes that “in the absence of preferential discrimination, everyone carries contraband,” which is “not true.” Sanga,
supra note 339, at 407. Moreover, “the quest to empirically decompose motives
into distinctly moral and economic categories can prove quixotic.” Id. at 409.
For an extensive critique of this and other assumptions of the KPT model, see
Robin S. Engel & Rob Tillyer, Searching for Equilibrium: The Tenuous Nature
of the Outcome Test, 25 JUST. Q. 54, 65–66 (2008).
Persico and Todd cite the fact that equal hit rates are observed as evidence that their assumptions are correct. Persico & Todd, supra note 382, at
45. In their original paper, hit rates for Hispanics did not equal rates for
whites. Knowles et al., supra note 33, at 222; accord Rubén HernándezMurillo & John Knowles, Racial Profiling or Racist Policing? Bounds Tests in
Aggregate Data, 45 INT’L ECON. REV. 959, 972 (2004) (same result in a Missouri sample). A subsequent analysis by Sanga of a greater sample of the same
data from Maryland used by KPT found lower hit rates for both blacks and
Hispanics. Sarath Sanda, Reconsidering Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence, 117 J. POL. ECON. 1155, 1159 (2009). Applying KPT’s
own verification criterion, therefore, the theory fails. See id.
389. See, e.g., Shamena Anwar & Hanming Fang, An Alternative Test of
Racial Prejudice in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence, 96 AM.
ECON. REV. 127, 130–32 (2006) (accounting for officers’ race); Dhammika
Dharmapala & Stephen L. Ross, Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Additional Theory and Evidence, 3 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1,
14 (2004) (accounting for offense severity and vehicle ownership).
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CONCLUSION
Aggressive deployment of Terry stops has been a point of
friction between urban police and impoverished minority communities for more than fifty years. There has been a moment of
late in which a measure of reform appeared politically feasible—or so the recent spate of settlements and consent decrees
390
might suggest. It may well be that this window is closing due
to national-level political changes. But the underlying problems
of discriminatory policing, popular dissatisfaction with excessive and onerous street hassle, and the frequency of police violence will not go away. Even if the federal government fails to
act, there are local, state, and private actors with strong incentives to press for reform. Nevertheless, without a clear account
of why and when aggressive deployment of Terry stops can be a
moral wrong, we will not have a clear sense of when or how we
might deploy law to remedy it.
To this end, this Article has aimed to specify the distinctive
moral wrong of SQF and to demonstrate that the law does have
resources to identify it. My central claim has been that a disparate-impact lens, applicable to police pursuant to Title VI
and state law, provides a better vantage point than black-letter
constitutional law. By demonstrating that a disparate-impact
lens is constitutional, potent, and practicable in terms of its
implementation, I hope to prompt a deeper conversation about
the positive role that law and courts can play in resolving the
aching sore that is minority-police relations in America’s cities
today.
What I have offered here, though, is emphatically only the
beginning of that story: the law, I have shown, can be used to
identify instances in which street policing plays a role in perpetuating and deepening racial and social stratification. Once
identified, dysfunctional policing must be remedied through political pressure and legal injunctions that will vary from juris391
diction to jurisdiction. There is no universal panacea. Police
reform, moreover, is only one element of a larger necessary
program of social reform necessary to dislodge the persistence
of racialized concentrated poverty. Police do not create ghettos.
Nor will getting policing right dissolve ghettos overnight. Nev-

390. See supra text accompanying notes 17–26.
391. For a useful examination of some possible avenues of institutional reform, see WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 63, at 117–45 (enumerating possible
reform measures).
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ertheless, doing the hard work of police reform is a necessary
step in rectifying the historical blight of entrenched racial
stratification.

